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Individual Responsibility for Assisting the
Nazis in Persecuting Civilians
Stephen J. Massey*
Recent events-the controversy over President Reagan's
visit to Bitburg, the attempt to identify Josef Mengele's re-
mains, the extradition and pending trial of John Demjanjuk,
and the strife over Kurt Waldheim's election in Austria-
demonstrate that the need to remember and assign responsibil-
ity for the Holocaust has retained its urgency. The United
States is implicated in that tragedy by its failure to do more to
rescue threatened Jews during World War II,' and by its post-
war immigration policies, which allowed entry to persons who
had assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians.
Since its establishment, the Justice Department's Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) has attempted to identify those
persons whose entry into the United States was illegal because
they assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians on the basis of
race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, and it has ini-
tiated a series of suits to denaturalize and deport such persons.
2
This Article focuses on the central issues these cases raise.3
* Attorney, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, New York. I
presented an earlier version of this Article to New York University's Law and
Philosophy Colloquium and acknowledge the helpful comments and sugges-
tions I received from the participants. I would like to thank Jim Weygandt
and, especially, Debra Livingston for our many discussions of the issues and
for their assistance in improving the Article.
1. See, e.g., D. WYMAN, THE ABANDOmiENT OF THE JEWS (1984).
Although he argues that the War Rescue Board, the United States govern-
ment's main effort, came into existence far too late, Wyman credits it with
saving approximately 200,000 Jews. Id. at 285-87. He holds a broad range of
individuals and groups responsible for failing to pursue other rescue proposals,
which he believes could have saved the lives of many more Jews. Id. at 311-40.
2. See A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
IN AMERICA (1984) (describing genesis and scope of efforts to identify and pros-
ecute persons living in the United States who assisted the Nazis).
3. This Article does not address all of the legal issues the cases raise.
For example, the Article does not consider the problems of identification
raised when witnesses seek to identify defendants as many as forty years after
the events in question occurred. See generally D. Nesselson & S. Lubet, Eye-
witness Identification in War Crimes Trials, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 75-94
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Part I includes a brief synopsis of the statutory framework un-
derlying the cases. Part II then provides an extensive discus-
sion of the leading Supreme Court case, United States v.
Fedorenko.4 Part III follows with an analysis of some difficult
cases that arose after the Supreme Court's decision in
Fedorenko. Because the Court decided Fedorenko before the
lower courts had much opportunity to construe the applicable
statutory provisions, these later cases present precisely those
"more difficult line-drawing problems" the Court identified but
did not resolve in Fedorenko.5 The belief that a defendant as-
sisted in persecution only if he personally participated in perse-
cution has constrained lower courts deciding these cases.6 The
courts' language and the results they reach, however, are often
more consistent with an approach to assistance in persecution
that looks not just to whether the defendant personally partici-
pated in persecution, but also to whether the defendant know-
ingly made more than minimal contributions to a group whose
objective was to persecute civilians.7 The result has been un-
predictable and inconsistent treatment of precisely what consti-
tutes assistance in persecution.
Having addressed the state of the law in Parts I-III, Part IV
of this Article discusses some recent philosophical work on in-
d&vidual and collective responsibility that offers guidance to
(1980) (discussing problems of proof and identification raised by denaturaliza-
tion proceedings). Nor does the Article discuss the due process questions that
have so bothered some courts. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d
488, 501-06 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
had countenanced severe due process violations), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188
(1986).
4. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
5. Id. at 513 n.34.
6. See, e.g., Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that assistance in persecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982) requires
"proof of personal active assistance or participation in persecutorial acts"); see
also United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
the government failed in its burden of proof where it could show only that de-
fendant had "passively accommodated the Nazis, while performing occasional
ministerial tasks... which by themselves cannot be considered oppressive").
7. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 81 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (stating that although evidence did not sufficiently prove that the de-
fendant had personally participated in the atrocities, "the evidence as a whole
leaves little doubt that.., the defendant, must have known of the harsh re-
pressive measures which [his organization was] carrying out pursuant to Ger-
man direction"), aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986); United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348,
1351 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding assistance in persecuting civilian Jews where de-
fendant admitted to bringing Jews not wearing armbands to police station and
to reporting civilians who sold food to Jews).
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courts deciding what constitutes assistance in persecution.
Moral philosophers have focused on contexts in which individu-
als may seek to deflect blame onto the organizations of which
they are a part by arguing that "the organization" is to blame,
8
that they were only doing their jobs,9 or that their contribu-
tions were too minimal to justify holding them morally respon-
sible.10  In analyzing such situations, philosophers have
examined the problems various groups present for assigning in-
dividual responsibility and have argued that to properly evalu-
ate an individual's acts it is necessary to consider how those
acts foreseeably combine with the acts of others to produce sig-
nificant effects, for good or evil.1 '
Drawing from the work in moral philosophy, this Article
proposes that courts treat personal participation in persecution
as a sufficient, though not necessary, condition of finding that a
defendant assisted in persecution. Part of the reason for this
conclusion is the difficulty of defining "assistance in persecu-
tion." Even when it is impossible to characterize a defendant's
own acts as persecutorial, he may have assisted in persecution
by virtue of knowingly having made more than minimal contri-
butions to an organization which had as an objective the perse-
cution of civilians. The philosophical work provides guidance in
the difficult task of assessing an individual's contribution to a
collective outcome.
Although the intention of this Article's philosophical dis-
cussion is to shed light on the central legal issues, a considera-
tion of the cases included in Part IV may also advance
understanding of the general problem of assigning individual
responsibility for the outcomes of collective efforts. Although
helpful, the contributions of moral philosophers are sometimes
8. See, e.g., French, Morally Blaming Whole Populations, in PHILOSOPHY,
MORALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 226, 278-82 (V. Held, S.
Morgenbesser, T. Nagel eds. 1974) (discussing instances where collectivity is
blameworthy although individual members are not). See also Cooper, Collec-
tive Responsibility, 43 PHIL. 258, 260 (1968) (analyzing fault of tennis club for
closing which could not be ascribed to individual members).
9. See, e.g., T. TAYLOR, NUREMBURG AND VETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAG-
EDY 42-53 (1970) (addressing the defense of obedience to a superior's orders).
See also Wasserstrom, The Responsibility of the Individual for War Crimes, in
PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 47, 56-62 (examining
moral culpability of combat soldiers who obey orders from superiors).
10. See, e.g., Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Orga-
nizations, 54 THE MONIST 488, 513-15 (1970) (discussing moral responsibility of
individuals for organizational actions and decisions in which they played negli-
gible or small roles).
11. See infra notes 225-261 and accompanying text.
1986]
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limited by their emphasis on contrived12 or trivial1 3 situations
or on the responsibility of only relatively high-level officials. 14
The cases, in contrast, involve serious situations rich and varied
in detail; the defendants are often relatively low-level person-
nel. A better understanding of how to correctly decide the
cases may thus enhance understanding of the responsibility of
low-level personnel for their contributions to collective
outcomes.
15
The final section of this Article, Part V, addresses the ques-
tion whether the Government should continue to maintain a
special unit of the Justice Department, the OSI, devoted to
identifying, denaturalizing, and deporting individuals who com-
mitted crimes long ago and who have, since then, lived law-
abiding lives in the United States for many years. Some have
argued for the abolition of the OSI or for the imposition of a
statute of limitations on the charges it brings.' 6 One courtroom
observer aptly expressed the sentiment behind such demands
when, while passing by a hearing room in which the OSI was
seeking to deport a person who had assisted the Nazis in perse-
cution, he asserted that "the money for bringing the [deporta-
tion] case would be used better to prosecute drug dealers.' 17
12. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, Collective Responsibility in DOING AND DESERV-
ING 222, 248 (1970) (discussing individual responsibility for failure to act to
save property when Jesse James robbed entire car full of passengers).
13. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 8, at 260 (1968) (analyzing individual re-
sponsibility of members for closing of local tennis club).
14. See generally Levinson, Responsibility for Crimes of War, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 244 (1973) (focusing on responsibility for war crimes of relatively
high-level officials in Germany during World War II and in America during
the Vietnam War). See also Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 63-70 (same). But
see id. at 57-62 (addressing responsibility for war crimes of individual soldiers
in battle). Cf. Wasserstrom, The Relevance ofNuremburg, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
22, 29-40 (1971) (analyzing responsibility for war crimes of inductee who must
decide whether to accept conscription).
15. The technique Claude Lanzmann employs in his highly acclaimed doc-
umentary, Shoah, also emphasizes the responsibility of lower-level personnel,
including the non-Jewish inhabitants of villages from which the Germans took
and murdered all Jews. Because Lanzmann does not use films from the era,
the highest officials actually involved in the killing that the viewer sees are
relatively low-level SS personnel and camp guards. In the same way as do
these cases, Shoah forces the viewer to reflect on the responsibility of people
other than high-level officials for collective outcomes.
16. The Baltimore Jewish Times, March 15, 1985, at 66; see also United
States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (questioning the ba-
sis of enormous government expenditures in denaturalization proceeding
against "model American citizen" which exceeded expenditures in prosecution
of mafia don), rev'd, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
17. The Baltimore Jewish Times, supra note 16, at 66.
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This Article addresses these questions and sentiments and con-
cludes that the OSI should remain intact and that the imposi-
tion of a statute of limitations on the charges it brings is
inappropriate.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. DENATURALIZATION
Historically, the Government has initiated both denaturali-
zation and deportation proceedings against persons whom it be-
lieves assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians.' 8  The
Government's authority to denaturalize a citizen derives from
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (1952 Act).1 9
Although a suit to denaturalize is a civil proceeding, the Gov-
ernment must show, by "evidence of a clear and convincing
character, '20 that citizenship was "[1] illegally procured or ...
[2] procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation."'2 1
18. Although in both denaturalization and deportation proceedings the
Government has offered, with some success, grounds unrelated to the claim
that the defendant assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians, this Article fo-
cuses on that claim alone.
19. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1953) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)
(1982)). This section provides that:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective
districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute pro-
ceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 310 of this
title [8 USCS 1421(a)] in the judicial district in which the naturalized
citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of re-
voking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizen-
ship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that
such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or
were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrep-
resentation, and such revocation and setting aside of the order admit-
ting such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of
naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order
and certificate, respectively: Provided, That refusal on the part of a
naturalized citizen within a period of ten years following his naturali-
zation to testify as a witness in any proceeding before a congressional
committee concerning his subversive activities, in a case where such
person has been convicted of contempt for such refusal, shall be held
to constitute a ground for revocation of such person's naturalization
under this subsection as having been procured by concealment of a
material fact or by willful misrepresentation. If the naturalized citi-
zen does not reside in any judicial district in the United States at the
time of bringing such suit, the proceedings may be instituted in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the
United States district court in the judicial district in which such per-
son last had his residence.
20. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 123 (1943).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). Section 18 of the 1961 amendment to the Im-
1986]
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In denaturalization suits for illegal procurement of citizen-
ship,22 the Government argues that a defendant's failure to law-
fully enter the United States23 by means of a valid immigration
visa, a condition precedent to naturalization, mandates denatu-
ralization.24 The Government reasons that because such de-
fendants assisted in the persecution of civilians, the defendants
were ineligible for visas under the terms of the acts permitting
their entry into the United States.25 A defendant's willful mis-
migration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 656 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982)) restored illegality in the procurement of
naturalization as a ground for revocation of naturalization. Although this
ground had been present in prior revocation statutes, it was omitted from the
Immigration and Nationality Act (1952 Act) as originally enacted. See H.R.
REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2950, 2982.
22. "Naturalization is illegally procured if some statutory requirement
which is a condition precedent to naturalization is absent at the time the peti-
tition was granted." H.R. REP. No. 1086, supra note 21, at 39; 1961 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 21, at 2983.
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1982); see also Immigration Act of 1924, Ch. 190,
§ 13(a), 43 Stat. 153, 161 (1924) (repealed 1952).
25. Many defendants entered the United States pursuant to the terms of
the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (1948 Act), Ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). See,
e.g., United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (defend-
ant entered the United States in 1949). In its definition of "displaced person"
eligible for entry, the 1948 Act incorporated annex I of the Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization (IRO), which stated that persons who had
"assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries" were not
"the concern" of the IRO. I.R.O. CONST. annex I, pt. II, reprinted in 62 Stat.
3037, 3051-52 (1948); Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Ch. 647, § 2(b), 62 Stat.
1009 (1948).
In 1950, the 1948 Act was amended, and additional defendants were admit-
ted pursuant to that amendment. An Act to Amend the Displaced Persons
Act, Ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (1950). The amended § 13 barred visas to "any person
who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, or natural origin." Id, at 227. See, e.g., United States v. Sprogis, 763
F.2d 115, 117 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendant entered America in 1950 under
terms of amended 1948 Act).
Other defendants have entered the United States under the provisions of
the Refugee Relief Act, Ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (1953) (omitted 1957), which con-
tained a provision, § 14(a), which barred visas to "any person who personally
advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons be-
cause of race, religion, or national origin." Id. at 406. But see A. RYAN, supra
note 2, at 327 n.* (asterisk-indicated footnote) (Act "contained no effective en-
forcement mechanism against the Nazi war criminals it ostensibly barred").
Finally, some defendants have entered under the normal procedures of
the 1952 Act, Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1953) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1982)). Ryan states that because this Act
did not bar Nazis until the Holtzman amendment of 1978, [OSI's] task
was slightly more complex. In those cases, [OSI] produced the State
Department officials who had issued the visas; they testified that they
[Vol. 71:97
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representation or concealment of facts, such as his residence or
occupation during the war, also provides a basis for the Govern-
ment's claim that a visa was illegally obtained.26
Similarly, the Government supports denaturalization suits
on the ground that, subsequent to admission, the defendant
procured citizenship "by concealment of a material fact or by
willful misrepresentation."2 7 The facts typically concealed or
misrepresented were the defendant's wartime location,28 em-
ployment,29 or organizational affiliations.30 Thus, the Govern-
had the discretion to deny a visa to anyone who, in their opinion,
would not have been a desirable immigrant, and that this certainly in-
cluded Nazi war criminals.
A. RYAN, supra note 2, at 248 n.* (asterisk-indicated footnote). Only a few de-
fendants have entered under the terms of the earlier 1924 and 1918 Acts.
26. Section 10 of the 1948 Act states that "[a]ny person who shall willfully
make a misrepresentation for the purposes of gaining admission into the
United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible
into the United States." Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Ch. 647, § 10, 62 Stat.
1009, 1013 (1948).
Section 212 of the 1952 Act, currently found at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19)
(1982), similarly renders ineligible for a visa any person who has "procured a
visa... by willfully misrepresenting a material fact." Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, Ch. 477, § 212, 66 Stat. 163 (1953).
As a third basis for claiming that a defendant illegally obtained citizen-
ship, the Government argues that the defendant lacks the good moral charac-
ter required for citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a)(3), 1427(e) (1982). Evi-
dence offered to show lack of good moral character is generally either evi-
dence pointing to assistance in persecution or evidence that the defendant
made material misrepresentations in the process of acquiring citizenship. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (1982). Because either of these underlying bases themselves
provide a legally sufficient reason for denaturalizing a defendant, courts have
properly treated the claim that the defendant lacks good moral character as a
subsidiary argument to which they have devoted minimal attention or analy-
sis. See, e.g., United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 nn.45, 47
(N.D. Ohio 1981) (treating briefly the claim that defendant lacks required good
moral character and employing the claim merely as an additional reason to de-
naturalize), qffl'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982);
United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 103 n.31 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1381-82 (N.D.
Ohio 1981) (defendant suppressed facts concerning his whereabouts during the
war which, if disclosed, would have warranted denial of his petition for natu-
ralization), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348, 1352-53 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (defendant misrepresented himself as having been a dairy farmer in Po-
land during the war).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Schellong, 547 F. Supp. 569, 574-75 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (defendant's failure to list with specificity his affiliation with organiza-
tions such as the SS Death's Head Unit "Sachsen" constituted concealment of
a material fact and justified revocation of citizenship), aff'd, 717 F.2d 329 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
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ment maintains that not only those concealments or
misrepresentations made in the process of obtaining a visa, but
also those made at the time the defendant sought naturaliza-
tion, are relevant.
B. DEPORTATION
The Government's authority to deport derives from section
241(a) of the 1952 Act.31 In seeking to deport a defendant, the
Government relies on two principal grounds. As in suits for de-
naturalization, fraudulent statements or misrepresentations
made to obtain a visa provide a basis for deportation.3 2 Here
also, the fraudulent or willful material misrepresentations typi-
cally involve either the defendant's location or employment
during the war, or his organizational affiliations.33 The Govern-
ment in deportation cases also maintains that persons who as-
sisted in persecuting civilians and who entered the country
under the terms of various Acts which explicitly rendered ineli-
gible those who had assisted the enemy in persecuting civilians,
lacked valid visas at the time of their entry and are, thus, de-
portable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181(a) and 1251(a)(1) (1982).3 4
Because the terms of early Acts did not contain explicit ex-
clusions, difficulty in deporting individuals who entered the
31. Currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
32. Such statements provide a basis for deportation on several different
legal grounds. First, if the defendant entered the country under the terms of
the 1948 Act, his visa is invalid under § 10 of that Act. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Second, if the defendant entered under the 1952 Act he is
ineligible to receive a visa and excludable according to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19)
(1982). See supra note 26. Provisions of the 1952 Act apply only to those de-
fendants entering the country after that Act became effective. Although the
1924 Act did not contain a specific statutory ground rendering excludable
those persons who obtained a visa through misrepresentation, it did provide, in
§ 13(a)(1), that an alien is excludable unless he has an unexpired immigrant
visa. Immigration Act of 1924, Ch. 190, § 13(a)(1), 43 Stat. 153, 161 (1924) (re-
pealed 1952). Cases interpreting § 13(a) of the 1924 Act have held that a visa
obtained through a material misrepresentation "is not a valid visa and hence is
no visa." Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also United
States v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951) in this regard. Finally,
because a visa obtained through fraud or willful misrepresentation is not valid,
a third basis for exclusion is 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1982). See infra note 34.
33. See supra notes 28-30.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1982), in relevant part, provides that "no immigrant
shall be admitted into the United States unless at the time of application for
admission he (1) has a valid, unexpired immigrant visa . . . ." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1982) provides that the Attorney General can order deportation of
any alien who "at the time of entry was within one or more of the classes ex-
cludable by the law existing at the time of entry[.]"
[Vol. 71:97
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country under their terms was expected.35 This concern led, in
1978, to passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act-Nazi
Germany (1978 Act).36 The 1978 Act explicitly renders ineligi-
ble to receive visas, excludable from admission,37 and deport-
able38
[a]ny alien who during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and
ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government in Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces
of the Nazi government of Germany,
(C) any government established with the assistance or coopera-
tion of the Nazi government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government
of Germany,
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion.
3 9
Because denaturalization and deportation proceedings can
rest on various grounds, the cases involve a variety of different
statutory formulations, including: 1) "assisted the enemy in
persecuting civil populations;' 40 2) "advocated or assisted in the
persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national
origin;" 41 3) "personally advocated or assisted in the persecu-
tion of any person or group of persons because of race, religion,
or national origin;" 42 and, 4) in collaboration with the Nazis,
"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the per-
secution of any person because of race, religion, national origin,
35. See 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4700, 4702.
36. Immigration and Nationality Act-Nazi Germany, Pub. L. No. 95-549,
92 Stat. 2065 (1978) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(33), 1182(d)(3), 1251(a)(19),
1253(h), 1254(e) (1982)). See H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4700, 4702.
37. § 212(a)(33) of the 1952 Act (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (1982)).
38. § 241(a)(19) of the 1952 Act (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982)).
39. Id, Even when a person is deportable under other statutory sections,
the Government has pressed for finding deportability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(19) because discretionary relief by the Attorney General is unavaila-
ble to aliens found deportable under the latter provision. See The 1952 Act,
supra note 25, §§ 241(f) (waiver); 243(h)(2)(A) (withholding); 244(a) (suspen-
sion); 244(e) (voluntary departure) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(f);
1253(h)(2)(A); 1254(a), and 1254(e) (1982) respectively). A defendant found de-
portable under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) also is ineligible for asylum under § 208
of the 1952 Act (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982)), for failure to qualify as a
refugee within the meaning of § 101(a)(42)(A) of the 1952 Act (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982)).
40. See supra note 25.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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or political opinion. ' 43 Courts44 and Congress, 45 however, have
generally ignored these differences. Both have treated the vari-
ous formulations as different expressions of the same underly-
ing concern, which is whether the defendant assisted the Nazis
in persecuting civilians because of race, religion, national origin,
or political opinion.46
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982).
44. For example, Judge Kearse treated a case construing the most general
first formulation as dispositive of the issue of assistance in persecution arising
under the most specific last formulation. Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 445-
46 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), which
construed § 2(b) of the 1948 Act, in deciding a case arising under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(19) (1982)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986). Another respected ju-
rist, Judge Lumbard, cited a case construing the most specific last formulation
as authority in a case arising under the less specific second formulation.
United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Laipenieks v.
INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985), which construed 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) in
deciding a case arising under the 1948 Act, §§ 2(b) and 13 as amended).
45. In amending the 1952 Act to add the very specific last formulation,
Congress saw nothing deficient in the prior formulations containing language
excluding persons who had assisted in persecution. Its concern was rather to
add a provision that would exclude the very same persons who would have
been excludable had they entered under the terms of the Acts containing the
excluding language, but who entered under Acts that did not contain such lan-
guage. See H.R. REP. No. 1452, supra note 36, at 3, 8; U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, supra note 36, at 4702, 4707.
46. The argument that the first formulation, in § 2(b) of the 1948 Act, dif-
fers from the remaining three because it contains no requirement that the per-
secution be "because of race, religion ...." is unconvincing. Cf. Maikovskis v.
INS, 773 F.2d 435, 456 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., concurring) (stating that the
1948 Act definition differs from that in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982) because it
"makes no mention of political motivation in describing persecution"), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986). As noted, § 2(b) of the 1948 Act incorporates by
reference the IRO constitution's definition of "refugee," "displaced persons,"
and those who were "the concern" of the IRO. See supra note 25 and infra
note 63. The problem of persecution confronted by the IRO after World War
II involved persecution because of race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion. See L. HoLBoRN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION 1
(1956) (identifying as the largest twentieth century refugee movements those
created by political and racial persecution). In defining what counted as a ref-
ugee's valid objection to returning to his home country, the IRO constitution
explicitly referred to "persecution, or fear based on reasonable grounds of per-
secution because of race, religion, nationality or political opinions[.]" See I.R.O.
CONST. supra note 25, at annex I, pt. I, § Cl(a)(i). The requirement that the
persecution be related to features such as race, religion, national origin, or
political opinion is implicitly part of the definition of persons who are not of
concern to the IRO. Its omission from the explicit definition is best explained
by the drafting problems that plagued the IRO. See infra note 90.
Instead of the full phrase, "assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians be-
cause of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion," this Article some-
times uses the shorter "assistance in persecution" or "assisted in persecuting
civilians."
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C. ASSISTANCE IN PERSECUTION AND MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATIONS
Although it is clear that the concepts of assistance in perse-
cution and material misrepresentation (concealment or fraud)
are central to the cases, the relation between the two has en-
gendered uncertainty. In Fedorenko, the Court declined to de-
cide several key materiality issues. Consequently, without
going beyond the Supreme Court's holding in Fedorenko, it is
doubtful that a court will find a misrepresentation or conceal-
ment material unless it first finds that the defendant assisted
the Nazis in persecuting civilians.
47
Courts have taken stands on the materiality issues the
Supreme Court left unresolved in Fedorenko.48 The assistance
in persecution issue, however, remains primary. If a defendant
in a denaturalization suit has not misrepresented or concealed
his location, employment, or organizational affiliations, the
court cannot avoid deciding whether he assisted in persecuting
civilians.49 Even when the defendant has made misrepresenta-
tions, a firm understanding of what activities constitute assist-
ance in persecuting civilians is necessary to determine whether
the misrepresentations are material. Likewise, in the deporta-
tion context, if the Government claims that the defendant was
excludable or is deportable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(1)(33),
1251(a)(19) (1982), explicitly addressing persecution, the court
cannot avoid deciding the assistance-in-persecuting-civilians
question. Consequently, assistance in persecution is both the
primary legal concept and the one that most requires examina-
tion if these cases are viewed, at least in part, as attempting to
ascertain individual responsibility for Nazi crimes.
47. See United States v. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490, 508-16 (1981) (finding
that misrepresentation is material if it would have rendered applicant ineligi-
ble for a visa, and concluding as matter of law that all who assisted in the per-
secution of civilians are ineligible under § 2(a) of the 1948 Act).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516, 529 (3rd Cir. 1986) (ad-
dressing materiality); Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 440-42 (2d Cir. 1985)
(same).
49. For example, in United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985),
despite the fact that Sprogis had not misrepresented his location, employment,
or organization affiliations, the government charged him with making misrep-
resentations. On the facts of this case, the district court properly observed
that "in order to prevail under any of its theories, the government had to show
that [the defendant] assisted in the persecution of Jews or other civilians ......
Id. at 120.
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II. UNITED STATES V. FEDORENKO0
In 1941, Feodor Fedorenko was a Ukrainian member of the
Russian Army.5 ' Within a month of mobilization, Fedorenko
was captured by the Germans and transported first to one pris-
oner of war camp, and then another. He was subsequently cho-
sen for transfer to a work camp and was ultimately moved to
Poland where he served as an armed guard at Treblinka, the
Nazi death camp.52 Fedorenko was issued a uniform, given a
rifle, and allowed only limited time away from the camp.53
Treblinka was closed after a prisoner uprising in 1943,4 and
Fedorenko served at various German labor and prisoner of war
camps until 1945.55 When the British liberated Hamburg in
1945, Fedorenko passed himself off as a civilian and worked as
a farm laborer until 1949. At that time, he gained permanent
admission to the United States under the 1948 Displaced Per-
sons Act (1948 Act).56 The 1948 Act specifically excluded from
the category of "displaced persons" individuals who had "as-
sisted the enemy in persecuting civilians. '57
In his application for a visa under the 1948 Act, Fedorenko
deliberately lied about his wartime activities. He concocted a
story of forced labor in a factory in Poelitz during 1942-45,
thereby concealing his service as an armed camp guard at Treb-
linka for ten months during that period.58 In 1969, again con-
cealing his service at Treblinka, he applied for and was granted
United States citizenship.59
In 1976, the Government brought a denaturalization action
against Fedorenko under section 340(a) of the 1952 Act.6 0 The
Government charged that Fedorenko's service as an armed
50. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
51. Id. at 494.
52. 455 F. Supp. 893, 900-01 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.
1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). For a thorough discussion of the atrocities
that took place at Treblinka, see id. at 901 n.12. It is estimated that at least
800,000 persons were murdered at Treblinka during World War II. 449 U.S. at
494 n.2.
53. 449 U.S. at 494.
54. See R. HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEws 915-16
(Rev. ed. 1985) (providing a vivid description of this uprising).
55. 449 U.S. at 494.
56. See supra note 25 discussing the 1948 Act.
57. 449 U.S. at 495. For a brief discussion of the relevant provisions of the
1948 Act, see infra note 63.
58. 449 U.S. at 496.
59. Id
60. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of
denaturalization.
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guard and his commission of atrocities at Treblinka constituted
assistance in persecution of civilians and that he was, therefore,
ineligible for a visa under section 2(b) of the 1948 Act. Thus, he
had obtained his citizenship illegally and denaturalization was
necessary. The government also argued that Fedorenko's visa
was procured through willful misrepresentation of material
facts concerning his wartime activities because when he applied
for an immigration visa in 1949, Fedorenko concealed his ser-
vice at Treblinka. The Government maintained that this was
material information and, because it was concealed, revocation
of Fedorenko's citizenship was mandated.
6 1
A. THE LOWER COURTS
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida found for Fedorenko.62 During the trial, a vice-con-
sul who had reviewed 1948 Act applications testified that, had
Fedorenko revealed the facts about his employment during
1942-45, an investigation would have ensued to determine
whether he was excludable under section 2(b) of the 1948 Act.6 3
The district court, however, rejected the Government's argu-
ment that, under United States v. Chaunt,64 the vice-consul's
61. 449 U.S. at 497-98.
62. 455 F. Supp. 893, 921 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.
1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
63. Section 2(b) of the 1948 Act defines a "displaced person" as "any dis-
placed person or refugee as defined in annex I of the Constitution of the Inter-
national Refugee Organization and who is the concern of the International
Refugee Organization." Part II of annex I, in turn, states that among those
who are not of concern to the IRO are:
2. Any other persons who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of
countries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the out-
break of the second world war in their operations against the United
Nations.1
I.R.O. CONST. annex I, pt. II, reprinted in 62 Stat. 3037, 3051-52 (1948) (foot-
note in original).
Footnote 1 in § 2(b) states:
Mere continuance of normal and peaceful duties, not performed
with the specific purpose of aiding the enemy against the Allies or
against the civil population of territory in enemy occupation, shall not
be considered to constitute "voluntary assistance." Nor shall acts of
general humanity, such as care of wounded or dying, be so considered
except in cases where help of this nature given to enemy nationals
could equally well have been given to Allied nationals and was pur-
posely withheld from them.
Id.
64. 364 U.S. 350 (1960). In Chaunt, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
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testimony was sufficient to establish Fedorenko's misrepresen-
tations as material within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). 65
The court read Chaunt to require that the Government show
the existence of facts that would have warranted denying
Fedorenko's citizenship.66
Thus, the district court in Fedorenko next focused on
whether Fedorenko's activities as an armed guard constituted
assistance in the persecution of civilians.67 Although the court
described his activities in some detail, it did not decide whether
those activities constituted assistance in persectuion. The court
instead found that Fedorenko was not ineligible for admission
under section 2(b) of the 1948 Act.68 Because ineligibility under
that provision requires that the defendant have voluntarily as-
sisted in persecuting civilians and because the court held that
Fedorenko had no "feasible choice other than serving as a
guard, particularly at Treblinka, ' ' 69 it found that he was not in-
eligible for admission.
The district court in Fedorenko recognized that the lan-
guage of annex I of the Constitution of the International Refu-
gee Organization (IRO),70 incorporated by reference into
section 2(b) of the 1948 Act, presented an obstacle to finding
that assistance in persecution had to include a finding of volun-
tariness. Although the IRO constitution stated that those who
"voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the
second world war in their operations against the United Na-
tions" were not "of concern" to the IRO, it omitted the word
"voluntarily" when stating that those who had "assisted the en-
emy in persecuting civil populations of countries" were not "of
order revoking Chaunt's naturalization because he had procured citizenship by
concealment of several arrests. The Court held that the suppressed facts were
not material because the Government had failed to show that their disclosure
"(1) ... would have warranted denial of citizenship, or (2) ... might have been
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts war-
ranting denial of citizenship." Id at 355.
65. 455 F. Supp. at 915-16. According to the Government, Chaunt did not
impose upon it the burden of showing that the investigation would have re-
vealed ultimate facts justifying denial of citizenship. Instead, the Government
argued that it was sufficient if "the conceded facts prevented the Government
from making an investigation which might have resulted in a denial of citizen-
ship." Id. at 915 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 916.
67. Id. at 913-14.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 913.
70. See supra note 63.
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concern." 71 Nevertheless, the court read a voluntariness re-
quirement into the section 2(b) exclusion for fear that the most
deserving persons, prisoners who had survived death camps
such as Treblinka, would become ineligible for admission be-
cause of the involuntary assistance they had rendered to the
Germans in running the camps.72 The court concluded that be-
cause Fedorenko's acts as a camp guard at Treblinka were not
voluntary, his acts did not constitute assistance in the persecu-
tion of civilians for purposes of the 1948 Act, section 2(b). His
misrepresentations about his whereabouts and employment
during 1942-45 were, therefore, not material.73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed,74 finding that the district court's interpretation of
Chaunt eviscerated that case's second materiality test 75 by re-
quiring the Government to establish ultimate disqualifying
facts even when an applicant for citizenship had made misrep-
resentations in a situation where truthful responses would have
triggered an investigation. 76 The Fifth Circuit interpreted
Chaunt "to require only that the government prove by clear
and convincing evidence that disclosure of the true facts would
have led the government to make an inquiry that might have
uncovered other facts warranting denial of citizenship."77 The
court then relied on the testimony of the vice-consul, rejected
by the district court, to conclude that the Government had met
its burden. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, ordered Fedorenko's
denaturalization.
B. THE SUPREME COURT
Although the primary issue presented in the petition for
certiorari was whether the court of appeals had properly inter-
preted the Chaunt test,7 8 the Supreme Court declined to decide
whether Chaunt applied to misrepresentations made at the visa
procurement stage or to endorse any particular interpretation
71. 1d&
72. 455 F. Supp. at 913.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 954 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449
U.S. 490 (1981).
75. See supra note 64.
76. 597 F.2d at 951.
77. 1&L
78. United States v. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490, 526 (1981) (White, J., dis-
senting).
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of Chaunt.79 Instead, the Court maintained that, under any of
Chaunt's possible interpretations, a misrepresentation is mate-
rial when it hides the existence of ultimate facts which, if
known, would warrant denial of citizenship.8 0
Holding that Fedorenko's service as an armed camp guard
rendered him ineligible for a visa as a matter of law,81 the
Court chided the district court for ignoring the "plain lan-
guage" of section 2(b) of the 1948 Act and "traditional princi-
ples of statutory construction" in concluding that an applicant
was ineligible under section 2(b) only if his assistance was vol-
untary.8 2 The Court noted that the contrast between the lan-
guage of sections 2(a) and 2(b) in annex I of the IRO
constitution showed that "Congress was perfectly capable of
adopting a 'voluntariness' limitation where it felt that one was
necessary" and that "[u]nder traditional principles of statutory
construction, the deliberate omission of the word 'voluntary'
from § 2(a) [of Annex I] compels the conclusion that the statute
made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineli-
gible for visas."'8 3 The Court concluded, therefore, that because
Fedorenko's activities, voluntary or not, constituted assistance
in persecution, and thus warranted a visa denial, 4 his misrepre-
sentations concerning his whereabouts during 1942-45 were ma-
terial and his denaturalization was justified.85
1. Rejection of a Voluntariness Requirement
Although the Supreme Court in Fedorenko treated its deci-
sion as the only one compatible with the statutory provisions, 86
the plain language of the statute, the principles of statutory in-
terpretation, the legislative history of the 1948 Act and its
amendments, and the testimony of an administrator of the 1948
Act together establish that the available legal materials did not
mandate rejection of a voluntariness requirement.
The Court noted the language that annex I, part II of the
IRO constitution uses in referring to those persons who were
not the concern of the IRO.87 It omitted, however, a footnote
79. See id. at 508-09.
80. IdH at 509.
81. Id. at 514.
82. Id. at 512.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 509-10.
85. Id. at 514-15.
86. Id. at 512.
87. Id.
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the IRO appended to the end of section 2, which states in part:
"Mere continuance of normal and peaceful duties, not per-
formed with the specific purpose of aiding the enemy against
the Allies or against the civil population of territory in enemy
occupation, shall not be considered to constitute 'voluntary
assistance.' "88 The clear import of this footnote is that only
those who had voluntarily assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil populations were not of concern to the IRO. If this were
not the correct interpretation, the footnote would not address,
as it undoubtedly does, the question of what type of behavior in
relation to the civil population of enemy-occupied territory con-
stitutes voluntary behavior. The drafters of the IRO constitu-
tion may have thought that the voluntariness requirement,
which explicitly applied to assisting the enemy in operations
against the United Nations,8 9 was equally applicable to assisting
the enemy in persecuting civilians for the purpose of determin-
ing whether a person was of concern to the IRO. At the very
least, this footnote makes it uncertain whether only those who
had voluntarily assisted the enemy in persecuting civilians
were not of concern to the IRO.90
88. See supra note 63.
89. Id.
90. Louise Holborn's detailed description of the process by which the IRO
defined "refugee" and related terms shows that these definitions cannot bear
the close parsing and scrutiny that the Supreme Court gave them. The great-
est difficulty the IRO encountered was when attempting to define terms such
as "refugee" and "displaced person." L. HOLBORN, supra note 46, at 36. Of the
final definitions, Holborn states: "Annex I, Part I, consisted of a set of cum-
bersomely worded definitions which reflected compromise between the views
of the western countries-which on the whole sought to expand the defini-
tions-and those of the countries of origin, which tried to restrict them." Id. at
48. Although Holborn specifically refers to the definitions in part I of annex I,
the definitions in part II are at least as cumbersomely worded. In any case,
"the Constitution was only a framework for the work of the IRO, and the
spirit in which this work was to be carried out would be far more important
than the framework itself." Id. at 53. The definitions of "refugee" and "dis-
placed person" proved difficult for the IRO to administer fairly and impar-
tially, id. at 49, and there was an increasing tendency after 1948 for the IRO to
liberalize the interpretation of its own definitions. Id. at 210. Although Hol-
born refers to the IRO's task of determining which applicants had "voluntarily
assisted the enemy forces during the war," id. at 175, she does not refer to the
provision in annex I, part II, excluding those who had assisted the enemy in
persecuting civilians.
Congress itself was aware of the imprecision of the IRO's definition of
"displaced person." See S. REP. No. 1237, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 reprinted in
1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2513, 2514; see also 96 CONG. REc. 2467
(1950) (remarks of Sen. McCarran). When it came to amending the 1948 Act
in 1950, a group of senators thought that Congress should, for the first time,
frame its own definition of displaced persons and establish a government
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Principles of statutory construction do not unambiguously
support the Court's rejection of the view that in order to be in-
eligible for a visa a person had to have voluntarily assisted the
enemy in persecuting civilians. The Court wrote as though
Congress itself had drafted the distinction between those who
had "assisted the enemy in persecuting civilians" and those who
had "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces ... in their opera-
tions."91 The legislative history of the 1948 Act and its 1950
amendment reveal, however, that Congress never considered
the distinction between sections 2(a) and 2(b) of annex I, part II
of the IRO constitution.92 Congress adopted the IRO defini-
tions in toto because it saw such an adoption as the way to deal
with between 850,000 and 1,150,000 displaced persons in camps
in the American, French, and British sectors of Europe who
were still there long after over 7,000,000 other persons, dis-
placed at the end of the war, had found permanent residence.93
Because the IRO was the organization agreed upon to address
this problem, which included making initial determinations of
eligibility, it was reasonable for Congress simply to incorporate
the IRO definitions by reference into the 1948 Act.94 Where
Congress, for reasons independent of the specific language used
in defining a term in another document, has incorporated by
reference that document's definition of a term, a court should
not be obliged to show the same deference to the precise statu-
tory language as it is compelled to do when Congress itself ex-
plicitly formulates the definition or draws the distinction.
Moreover, the legislative history of the 1948 Act and its
1950 amendment reveal that Congress was unaware that the
1948 Act contained any provision rendering ineligible for visas
persons who had assisted the enemy in persecuting civilians.
Although Congress considered the IRO definition of displaced
persons when debating the 1948 Act, on no occasion did its at-
tention focus on whether those who had involuntarily assisted
agency for its administration. See generally 96 CONG. REC. 2636 (1950) (re-
marks of Sen. Eastland); 96 CONG. REC. 2467 (1950) (remarks of Sen.
McCarran).
91. 449 U.S. at 512.
92. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 1634-42 (1950); 96 CONG. REC. 2458-77 (1950); 95
CONG. REc. 7169-202 (1949); 94 CONG. REc. 7727-34 (1948) (The preceding cita-
tions are representative of topics debated by Congress. For additional cita-
tions, refer to the Index to Volumes of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The
absence of any reference to a distinction between §§ 2(a) and 2(b) of the IRO
constitution is noteworthy.).
93. See 94 CONG. REC. 7738-39, 7872 (1948) (remarks of Rep. Fellows).
94. See supra notes 90 and 92.
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the enemy in persecuting civilians were ineligible for visas.95
The 1950 amendment to the 1948 Act provided for an
amended section 13 which states that "[n]o visas shall be issued
under the provisions of this Act, as amended, ... to any person
who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person be-
cause of race, religion, or national origin .... ,96 Congress in-
terpreted this provision as excluding a class of individuals who
had not previously been excluded under the 1948 Act, despite
the fact that section 2(b) of the 1948 Act incorporated the IRO
definition of "displaced persons." In 1949, when enumerating
the distinctive features of House Bill 4567, for example, Rep.
Feighan stated: "Persons who advocated or assisted in the per-
secution of any person because of race, religion, or national ori-
gin would be added to those to whom no visas could be issued
under the act."'97 Statements such as this are quite remarkable
in view of the fact that section 2(b) of the 1948 Act incorpo-
rated by reference section 2(a) of annex I, part II of the IRO
constitution.98 At the very least, such statements show that
Congress paid virtually no attention to the distinction, with re-
spect to a voluntariness requirement, between sections 2(a) and
2(b) of annex I, part II of the IRO constitution.
Perhaps realizing the weakness of its statutory argument,
the Supreme Court placed great weight on the testimony of the
vice-consul involved in administering the 1948 Act as cor-
roborating the correctness of its statutory analysis.9 9 The vice-
consul testified that if Fedorenko had disclosed his activities as
an armed guard at Treblinka, he would have been declared in-
eligible for a visa under the 1948 Act.10 0 Although the testi-
mony of State Department officials is crucial in determining
whether a truthful statement would have triggered an investi-
gation that might have revealed disqualifying facts, it is of only
95. The focus of the debates was almost exclusively on the fact that vari-
ous favored groups-the Volkdeutsche, see 94 CONG. REc. 7770-78 (1948), Gen-
eral Anders' Polish soldiers stranded in London, see id at 6879-82, and certain
Greeks-were not considered "displaced persons" under the IRO constitution
and thus would be ineligible if the 1948 Act allowed visas only to those persons
whom the IRO defined as displaced.
96. An Act to Amend the Displaced Persons Act, Ch. 262, § 13, 64 Stat.
219, 227 (1950).
97. 95 CONG. REc. 7184 (1949) (emphasis added).
98. The argument that the amended § 13 changed the law by introducing
the new requirement that the persecution be "because of race, religion, na-
tional origin, or political opinion" is unconvincing. See supra note 46
99. 449 U.S. at 498-500.
100. Id. at 499.
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slight probative value in determining whether given acts consti-
tute assistance in persecuting civilians.' 0 '
Thus, neither the statutory materials nor the testimony of
the vice-consul dictated the Court's rejection of a voluntariness
requirement. This raises the question why the Court decided
the case as it did. One possibility is that the Court simply did
not believe that concentration camp guards served involunta-
rily, and was, therefore, unwilling to find for Fedorenko on the
basis of the district court's mistaken decision to the contrary. 0 2
More plausibly, it is likely that in interpreting "assistance in
persecuting civilians," the Court implicitly relied on beliefs
about those acts for which persons who worked in concentra-
tion camps are morally responsible. Because an individual who
was an armed guard bore more than minimal moral responsibil-
ity for assisting in persecution, regardless of whether the per-
son's acts were voluntary, the Court deemed it proper to find
that such an individual has met the legal standard of assisting
in persecution. Rather than openly acknowledge that it was
making a moral decision regarding the level of moral responsi-
bility necessary to find that an individual has met the legal
standard, the Court pretended that its conclusion was dictated
by neutral arguments of statutory construction. 0 3
101. As Judge Lumbard stated in United States v. Sprogis: "ITihe immigra-
tion officials' opinions regarding evidence which would have led them, in 1950,
to withhold permission to immigrate cannot be dispositive on the legal issue
which must be decided by the court, namely, what constitutes assistance in
persecution." 763 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (noting that the agency's construction was not necessarily the
only reasonable one or even the one preferred by the Court itself, but stating
that "[w]hen faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows
great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration").
102. There is evidence both that the Supreme Court believed that guards
served voluntarily, see 449 U.S. at 499 n.14, and that this belief is correct. See
R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 898 n.23. It is unlikely, however, that the Court
would have barred all categories of potential defendants from invoking invol-
untariness of service as a defense merely because it believed that camp guards
had served voluntarily.
103. See 449 U.S. at 512-14. Dworkin emphasizes how apparently neutral
semantic analyses may give more effect to judges' personal convictions (about
such questions as moral responsibility) than would a frankly political jurispru-
dence. R. DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 30 (1985). See also id- at 329
(contending that it is preferable to confront underlying moral choices than to
pretend that decisions are forced "by neutral arguments of statutory
construction").
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2. Two Approaches to Assistance in Persecution
Although the Supreme Court rejected the district court's
inclusion of a voluntariness requirement in section 2(b) of the
1948 Act, it felt obliged to address the district court's concern
that prisoners who had survived camps such as Treblinka might
become ineligible for visas because of assistance they had ren-
dered to the Germans. In an important footnote, the Court
concluded that, rather than read a voluntariness requirement
into section 2(b) of the 1948 Act, a court must focus on
"whether particular conduct can be considered assisting in the
persecution of civilians.
'10 4
Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female in-
mates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in
the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no ques-
tion that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle
and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to
leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admit-
ted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant
of the camp, fits within the statutory language about persons who as-
sisted in the persecution of civilians. Other cases may present more
difficult line-drawing problems but we need decide only this case.
105
The Court's statement suggests two different approaches to
interpreting assistance in the persecution of civilians. With the
first approach, an initial inquiry is made to determine whether
the collective activity to which the individual contributed con-
stitutes persecution of civilians because of race, religion, na-
tional origin, or political opinion. Certainly it is plausible to so
characterize the collective activity to which both the hair-cutter
and the armed camp guard contributed.
The next step under this first approach requires determin-
ing whether it is possible to characterize the individual's partic-
ular activity as assistance in that persecution. An important
difference between the armed camp guard and the hair-cutter
is the magnitude of their contributions to the collective effort.
Even though the hair-cutter made some contribution, it may
seem so minor that it renders the hair-cutter only minimally
morally responsible for the persecution wrought by the collec-
tive. Such a judgment is then expressed by finding that the
hair-cutter has not assisted in persecution. The magnitude of
the guard's contribution, on the other hand, is sufficiently great
to render him more than minimally responsible. This judg-
ment is expressed by finding assistance in persecution.
104. 449 U.S. at 512 n.34 (emphasis in original).
105. Id (emphasis in original).
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Consequently, once it is determined under this first ap-
proach that the collective to which the individual contributed
has persecuted because of race, religion, national origin, or
political opinion, it is necessary to look only at the nature of
the individual's contribution. Whether the individual's own
acts constitute persecution or the individual's personal motiva-
tion for acting are no longer part of the inquiry.
By italicizing the word "persecution" and noting that the
term persecution does not apply to some of the tasks performed
by concentration camp inmates,1 06 the Court suggested a second
approach that dictates a close nexus between individual conduct
and persecution. This approach is less a coherent theory of
assistance in persecution, which examines whether the objec-
tive of the collective enterprise constitutes persecution and
whether the individual's acts contributed to achieving that ob-
jective, and more an inquiry into whether what the individual
actually did is characterizable as persecution and an examina-
tion of the individual's own motivation for acting.
Under this approach, for the person's conduct to constitute
persecution, he need not have personally committed crimes or
atrocities. 0 7 A sufficient connection must exist, however, be-
tween the conduct and the persecution to justify speaking of
the individual's personal participation in persecution. Although
this second approach is vague, it is still possible to explain the
distinction the Court drew under its terms. For instance, even
though a camp guard has not personally committed atrocities, it
is still possible to characterize the guard's activities as per-
secutorial after examining them in context. An inmate, seeing
a camp guard patrolling with a rifle and pistol and knowing
that the guard will shoot if the inmate tries to escape, surely
sees the guard as a persecuting force. Even more so would a
guard's actual shooting at prisoners attempting to escape consti-
tute a form of persecution, even if the shots were fired over the
prisoners' heads. Conversely, in finding that the hair-cutter's
activity did not constitute persecution, the Court invokes a be-
nign picture of the concentration camp hair-cutter. Unlike the
guard, for the hair-cutter to perform his duties, it was unneces-
sary to use weapons or threatening gestures against inmates.
106. 1I
107. The Court found that Fedorenko had assisted in persecution despite
accepting the district court's finding that there was no clear and convincing ev-
idence "that petitioner committed crimes and atrocities against inmates while
he was an armed guard at Treblinka." Id. at 505 n.24.
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Thus, prescinding from the context in which these activities oc-
curred, it may seem proper to characterize one type of activity,
but not another, as persecution. 08
Although the Court intimated a preference for the second
approach, it is not necessary to adopt that approach to explain
the result in Fedorenko. Some courts dealing with the difficult
cases have also reached results consistent with both approaches.
When this is so, it is possible to ask which approach offers the
better explanation. Other courts have, however, reached re-
sults consistent with only one of the approaches. The discus-
sion now turns from Fedorenko to these cases.
III. THE DIFFICULT CASES
Since Fedorenko, the lower federal courts have decided, on
the merits, approximately a dozen cases involving the issue of
assistance in persecuting civilians.'0 9 Although there have been
"feasy" cases at both the armed camp guard"0 and hair-cutter"'x
108. When viewing the entire situation, this conclusion is far less clear.
The Nazis wanted the hair, which they used in manufacturing felt footwear
for U-boat personnel and Reichsbahn employees. R. HBERG, supra note 54,
at 954. Cutting the victims' hair also connected with the Nazis' desire to dehu-
manize their victims at the death camps. I& at 898; see also id. at 971 n.56 ("At
Belzec the naked women who had their hair cut were beaten on the head and
in the face.").
109. See Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 2915 (1986); United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985); Laipenieks
v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254
(N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258
(1986); United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd, 793 F.2d
516 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Kowachuk, 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1188 (1986); United States v. Schellong, 547 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1982),
aff'd, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); United
States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 130 (1984); United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd mem, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982); United
States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd per curiam, 680
F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. IM. 1984) (de-
fendant denaturalized because of wartime service as armed camp guard at
Treblinka labor camp), aff'd 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2258 (1986); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (defend-
ant denaturalized because of wartime service as supervisor at concentration
camp), aff'd mern, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982);
United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (defendant
denaturalized because of wartime service as camp guard at Treblinka and
many individual atrocities committed there), aff'd per curiam 680 F.2d 32 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
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ends of the continuum, the majority fall in the troubling middle
range. Although numerous cases have followed the Court's
holding in Fedorenko,"2 the ensuing discussion addresses those
cases especially illustrative of the difficulties that continue to
arise in the process of defining the concept of assistance in per-
secution. This Article now considers these cases in terms of the
two approaches previously discussed.
A. THREE UKRAINIAN POLICEMEN
In each of three cases involving Ukrainian policemen in
the Galicia region of pre-war Poland,113 the Government suc-
cessfully claimed that the defendant deserved denaturalization
because he had assisted in the persecution of civilians.
Although these results are defensible on the ground that the
individuals had personally participated in persecution, they are
more plausibly defensible under the contribution approach. 114
111. See, e.g., United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104,1144 (D.N.J. 1983)
(defendant not denaturalized because Government could prove with clear and
convincing evidence only residence in district where two massacres of civilians
occurred). On appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed, 793 F.2d 516, 530-
33 (3rd Cir. 1986), finding that Kungys's misrepresentations were material
without deciding whether he had assisted in persecuting civilians.
112. See Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986); United States v. Schellong, 547 F. Supp. 569
(N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007
(1984); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd
per curiam, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
113. United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d
1314 (11th Cir.), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 130 (1984); United States v. Dercacz,
530 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
114. Although the Ukrainians gave some help to escaping Jews, Hilberg
notes that the Germans, in their efforts to concentrate the Jews of Poland into
ghettoes, asserted control over regular indigenous police left or reorganized in
occupied territories. R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 598. In the Gener-
algouvernement region, Polish and (after the 1941 attack on the USSR)
Ukrainian police totaled more than 16,000. Id. at 201-03. In that phase of the
final solution in which the Germans employed mobile killing units, they were
assisted by Ukrainian militia, often paid by municipalities with funds confis-
cated from Jews. These militia performed tasks, such as shooting children,
that were deemed too corrupting and destructive for the Germans to do them-
selves. Id. at 313-14. Ukrainian stationary police in Galicia assisted the Ger-
many Order Police in rounding-up and deporting Jews to the death camps. In
Rawa Ruska, for example, the "roundup was conducted by police teams con-
sisting of one German, one Ukrainian, and one Jew." Id. at 486. See also id. at
519 (stating that the Ukrainians, never considered pro-Jewish, participated in
massacres of millions of Ukrainian Jews).
Hilberg presents a picture of the Ukrainians very different from that evi-
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1. Bohden Koziy
Bohden Koziy entered the United States in 1949 under the
1948 Act and was naturalized in 1956.115 In applying for a visa,
he stated that he had been employed as a tailor's apprentice
during the war. Thus he concealed his voluntary employment
with the Ukrainian police.1 16  The district court, citing
Fedorenko, held that "his employment with the Stanislau Kom-
mando of the Ukrainian Police" constituted one of four legally
independent grounds for finding that he was ineligible for a
visa under section 2(b) of the 1948 Act and that denaturaliza-
tion was warranted. 1 7
The Ukrainian police assisted the Nazis in transporting
Jews from their homes to the ghettoes, participated with Ger-
man police in security sweeps, made arrests within the Stanis-
lau ghetto, and aided the Germans in rounding-up Jews to
bring them to the ghettoes. 118 Although Koziy had served vol-
untarily as a Ukrainian policeman, the district court made only
one specific finding connecting Koziy, in his capacity as a mem-
ber of the Stanislau Kommando, with the Nazi objective of per-
secuting civilians. The court found that "[iln the summer of
1942 the Jews of Lisets were rounded up by the Ukrainian Po-
lice and forcibly relocated to the ghetto in Stanislau. Defend-
ant participated in this round-up." 11 9
Rounding-up of Jews (evicting them from their homes, for-
cibly relocating them, and confining them into ghettoes) plau-
dent in United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 513 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert,
C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986). In Kowalchuk, Chief
Judge Aldisert indicated that Ukrainians were as much the victims of the Na-
zis as were the Jews. "[W]ith the alternatives of arrest, torture, imprisonment,
and death staring them in the face, it is hardly surprising that many inhabit-
ants of occupied countries were passively accommodating to the Nazis." Id.
115. United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25, 34 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd 728 F.2d
1314 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 130 (1984).
116. Id. at 33.
117. 1&L at 35. Although it is plausible to characterize the personal atroci-
ties that Koziy committed as acts of persecution, the court regarded them as
one independent legal basis for his ineligibility for a visa under § 2(b) of the
1948 Act, see Conclusions of Law 70 & 73, while treating his employment with
the Stanislau Kommando of the Ukrainian Police as another independent
legal basis for ineligibility under § 2(b), see Conclusions of Law 69 & 73. I& at
35.
118. Id. at 27-30.
119. Id. at 30. In view of the court's findings regarding Koziy's own activi-
ties, including his personal involvement in several murders, Findings nos. 43 &
44, id. at 32, it was unnecessary to make specific findings that Koziy assisted
the Nazis in persecuting civilians. Id at 35.
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sibly qualifies as participation in persecution as contemplated
by the 1948 Act, section 2(b). Involvement in such a round-up
is unquestionably morally wrong because it substantially as-
sisted the Nazis in their goal of persecuting (annihilating) the
Galician Jews. Forcibly evicting Jews from their homes and
concentrating them in ghettoes was merely one step in a long
process. That process ultimately culminated in the Jews'
forced shipment to a concentration camp (in this case, Belzec),
and in their brutal murders.120 Given the importance of this
step, it follows that an individual who participated in it bears a
significant measure of moral responsibility for the death of the
Lisets Jews.
Although the district court in Koziy did not explain why it
concluded that Koziy's employment with the Stanislau Kom-
mando constituted assistance in persecuting civilians, it is con-
sistent with the court's result to say that an individual has
assisted in persecution even though that individual's particular
acts were not themselves persecutorial. Absent this conclusion,
a low ranking individual like Koziy might escape responsibility
for his knowing contribution to group persecutorial objectives.
2. Michael Dercacz
Michael Dercacz entered the United States in 1949 under
the 1948 Act and was naturalized in 1954.121 In his visa applica-
tion, Dercacz stated that he had been employed as a dairy
farmer during the war and concealed his service as a Ukrainian
policeman in the town of Novy Yarychev.12 2 The district court
granted the Government's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that, as a matter of law, the duties Dercacz admit-
ted performing constituted assistance in persecuting civilians. 12 3
Dercacz acknowledged that he had brought Jews not wearing
120. R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 158-87, treats the "concentration" stage
as crucial in the destruction process.
121. United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In
1982, the Government sought to deport Dercacz. He died in August 1983, just
one week before the deportation hearing was scheduled to begin.
122. Id. at 1349.
123. The district court described the persecution of Jews as follows:
In 1942, some 2,000 Jews of Novy Yarychev and other Jews from
surrounding villages were forcibly concentrated in a ghetto near the
town marketplace. The Jews were required to wear identifying arm-
bands, were restricted in movement, trade, food and water, and some
were used as forced laborers. In January 1943, the Jews were
rounded up and killed by German forces.
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identifying armbands to the police station and that he had re-
ported them to the commandant and the Gestapo. 2 4 Addition-
ally, he admitted reporting civilians who had sold food to the
ghettoized Jews.325 The court determined that "[t]hese admis-
sions provide clear and convincing evidence of defendant's in-
vidious duties as a member of the Ukrainian police in Novy
Yarychev and leave no doubt that defendant's service in such
police force assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilian Jews.'
26
It is plausible to depict the acts of reporting Jews not wear-
ing armbands and bringing them to the station as participation
in persecution. As with Koziy's actions,2 7 what seems im-
moral about such acts is that they contributed to the Nazis' goal
of ridding the area of Jews. The Nazis concentrated Jews in
ghettoes readily accessible to railroad transportation so that
they could easily transport them to the nearest killing center.
A system of identification, such as armbands, was necessary to
alert the Nazis to any potential victims who were not in the
ghetto. By identifying Jews who were not wearing armbands,
Dercacz substantially contributed to the Nazis' efficient identi-
fication and elimination of the largest possible number of Jews.
Dercacz's second activity, reporting civilians known to have
sold food to the ghettoized Jews, did not require personal con-
tact with the persecuted Jews. It is unclear, therefore, whether
such activity can be characterized as personal participation in
persecution. Nevertheless, it clearly constitutes assistance in
persecution because of its tendency to further isolate Jews from
other citizens of Novy Yarychev and to ensure their suffering
from an inability to obtain food. Thus, the better justification
for denaturalizing Dercacz is that his actions made a substantial
contribution to the Nazis' persecution, not that his actions were
themselves persecutorial.
3. Wolodymir Osidach
Osidach, like Koziy and Dercacz, entered the United States
in 1949 under the 1948 Act. 128 He was naturalized in 1963.129
124. Id. at 1351.
125. Id
126. Id The court did not specifically state that Dercacz was aware of Nazi
persecution of Jews. Because the duties he performed brought him into close
contact with both Jews and Germans, however, it is reasonable to assume
either that he was aware of the persecution or that he should have been.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 115-120.
128. United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Osidach
died in May 1981, before the appeal he had filed was heard.
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When he applied for a visa, he stated that he had been a dairy
mechanic during the war. In doing so, he concealed his service
as a Ukrainian policeman in the town of Rawa Ruska. 130 The
district court ordered Osidach's denaturalization.'3 '
The district court in Osidach identified four categories of
Ukrainian police activity in Rawa Ruska that it characterized
as assistance in persecution: 1) enforcing ghettoization and
laws enacted for the oppression of the Jewish population;
2) guarding and abusing Jewish slave laborers; 3) helping to de-
port Jews from the Rawa Ruska ghetto; and 4) assisting in the
liquidation of the ghetto.13 2 Using these categories, the court
determined that Osidach himself had participated in acts of
persecution,133 focusing on two separate activities in which he
had engaged from 1942 to 1944.134
Osidach admitted that he had patrolled the streets of Rawa
Ruska as a full-time, paid, and armed Ukrainian policeman.13 5
The court found that this activity itself constituted a form of
mental persecution.136 It reasoned that:
The mere presence of the watchful eye of the conqueror or his depu-
ties, coupled with the often demonstrated presence of both the means
and the inclination to persistently inflict various indignities, physical
abuse, injuries or even death, without notice or reason, is the personi-
fication of mental persecution, to anyone, let alone innocent civilian
men, women and children reduced to various degrees of substandard
129. Id.
130. Id. at 101.
131. Id. at 107.
132. I& at 86-91.
133. The court's focus on whether Osidach had participated in persecution
derived not only from its adoption of the participation-in-persecution ap-
proach, but also from errors it made in interpreting the statutory structure.
The court's most serious error was its claim that in the 1950 amendment to§ 13 of the 1948 Act "Congress further defined the act of assisting in the perse-
cution of civilians as being a 'member of, or participant in, a movement' that
persecuted civilians. Section 13, therefore, expanded upon the somewhat
vague IRO provision." Id at 70.
The new "member of, or participant in" language qualifies movements
hostile to the United States, or to its form of government, and not, as the dis-
trict court argued at great length, to movements which assisted in the persecu-
tion of persons because of race, religion, or national origin. The legislative
history does not support the district court's claim that the language Congress
added in the amended § 13 was intended to add to those who were ineligible
the entirely new categories of those who were merely voluntary members of
groups or participants in movements that assisted in the persecution of civil-
ians. See supra notes 90, 92 and accompanying text.
134. 513 F. Supp. at 96-100.
135. I at 97.
136. Id. at 99.
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mental and physical well-being.
1 37
Rather than characterizing the actual patrolling as persecution,
however, it is more plausible to say that Osidach's daily, armed
patrolling assisted the Nazis by substantially contributing to
their goal of annihilating the Jewish population of Rawa
Ruska. Patrolling policemen reminded Jews that any attempt
to escape almost certainly meant death and this fear tended to
make them more compliant. Thus, resistance was less likely.
Osidach also admitted that he had served as an interpreter
for the Ukrainian police and the German gendarmes.138 He in-
terpreted, for example, when the police arrested persons sus-
pected of being communists, and he acknowledged the
possibility that some of the people for whom he interpreted
were Jews.139 He claimed to have been the "main interpreter"
for the Ukrainian police and stated that while performing these
duties he had always carried a loaded pistol at his side.
140
The court maintained that Osidach's activities as an inter-
preter "could be classified as both physical and mental persecu-
tion."'' 4 ' Analyzing the case in this way requires acceptance of
a very broad definition of "physical or mental persecution." To
counter this definition of persecution, Osidach could have plau-
sibly defended his actions by stating that they were not them-
selves persecutorial and that, if any persecution occurred
during the interviews, the Germans were the persecutors. He
had merely translated their words.
The district court was sensitive to these problems in bring-
ing Osidach's activities as an interpreter within the participa-
tion-in-persecution framework. The court's language suggests
that what was most wrong with Osidach's activities is that they
contributed to the Nazis' objective of annihilating the Jews:. 42
0sidach's role as a full-time, paid and armed interpreter for both the
German gendarmes and the Ukrainian police made him a necessary
link between the Germans and the objects of their persecution-the
Jews in the town of Rawa Ruska-from 1942 to 1944. His ability to
translate three separate languages... in a multilingual German-occu-
pied area was obviously a vital skill he delivered to the Germans, who
at that very time were carrying forward their occupation policies.
143
The emphasized phrases highlight the important contributions
137. Id.
138. rL at 98.
139. 1d at 97.
140. Id. at 97-98.
141. Id. at 99.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 98 (emphasis added). Because Osidach was aware that the Nazis
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of someone functioning as the Nazis' "main interpreter." To ac-
complish their objective of annihilating all Jews and commu-
nists in an area where not everyone spoke German, it was
absolutely necessary that the Nazis rely on interpreters. With-
out such assistance, the Nazis could not have achieved their ob-
jective as efficiently or completely. 1 4
B. TWO HIGHER OFFICIALS
The following two cases advance the analysis from the or-
dinary policeman to higher officials, one, a Lithuanian mayor
and the other, a Latvian police chief. This extension is logical.
If those who personally participated by contributing to the ob-
jective of persecution are responsible for acts of persecution,
those officials who ordered that personal participation are like-
wise liable for acts of persecution. In deciding these cases, diffi-
cultly arises only if the court insists that the defendant's acts
themselves were persecutorial. Obviously, insistence on such a
requirement results in the exculpation of many higher officials,
because individuals in positions of greater authority are un-
likely to have personally performed acts that constitute perse-
cution.145 To avoid this unacceptable consequence, 146 those
adhering to the participation-in-persecution approach have to
maintain that an individual participates in persecution either by
were persecuting Jews, id. at 93, the knowledge requirement of the contribu-
tion approach was satisifed.
144. R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 312, notes the important contributions
made by native speakers to the Nazis' killing operations in areas, such as the
Ukraine, where German was not the predominant language.
145. In the judgment it issued after Adolf Eichmann's trial, the Israeli
court stated:
'[I]n such an enormous and complicated crime as the one we are
now considering, wherein many people participated, on various levels
and in various modes of activity-the planners, the organizers, and
those executing the deeds, according to their various ranks-there is
not much point in using the ordinary concepts of counseling and solic-
iting to commit a crime. For these crimes were committed en masse,
not only in regard to the number of victims, but also in regard to the
numbers of those who perpetrated the crime, and the extent to which
any one of the many criminals was close to or remote from the actual
killer of the victim means nothing, as far as the measure of his re-
sponsibility is concerned. On the contrary, in general the degree of re-
sponsibility increases as we draw further away from the man who
uses the fatal instrument with his own hands.'
H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
246-47 (rev. ed. 1964) (quoting the Israeli court) (Arendt's emphasis).
146. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 249 n.10 (it "reverse[s] the priorities of
sensible discussion" to focus on the atrocities of individual soldiers as "crimi-
nal" while treating the acts of higher officials as "merely" immoral).
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doing acts that are themselves persecutorial or by ordering
others to do such acts.
1. Kazys Palciauskas
Palciauskas entered the United States in 1948 under the
1948 Act and was naturalized in 1954.147 When he applied for a
visa he stated that he had been a clerk during the period of
Nazi occupation,148 thereby concealing that he had been the
mayor of Kaunas, Lithuania, from June 1941 to May 1942.-49
The district court ordered him denaturalized. 15 0
The district court made a number of factual findings rele-
vant to Palciauskas' assistance to the Germans. The Nazis es-
tablished a Jewish ghetto in Kaunas in July 1941, and, between
August and October 1941, engaged in a mass execution of
Jews.151 They paid Palciauskas a substantial salary, in valuable
German marks, for his service as mayor. In his capacity as
mayor, Palciauskas exercised considerable power over govern-
mental functions, housing, sanitation, and police.152 In addition,
Palciauskas knew of the Nazis' attitude toward the Jews15 3 and
had "some knowledge of horrible living conditions in the
ghetto."' 54 He also played a role in implementing the Nazis'
decisions.' 55
147. United States v. Palciauskas, 559 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1983),
affl'd, 734 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1984).
148. 559 F. Supp. at 1299.
149. 1d at 1296.
150. Id at 1301.
151. Id at 1296-97.
152. Id. at 1297.
153. Id.
154. Id at 1298.
155. Id at 1297; see also id. at 1296-97 n.3 (indicating ample and irrefutable
evidence that Palciauskas helped implement the directives of an order to es-
tablish the Kaunas ghetto).
The district court concluded its findings of fact by stating "As it appears
unnecessary to resolution of this proceeding, the Court makes no specific find-
ings relative to possible active participation by the defendant in acts of perse-
cution of Jews." Id at 1300. Given the findings already made by the court, this
statement can only mean that the court found it unnecessary to make any
finding that the defendant had personally engaged in acts of persecution to-
ward identifiable Jews.
In affirming, the court of appeals misinterpreted the district court's state-
ment to mean that it had made no findings regarding the defendant's coopera-
tion "with the Nazi regime in the ghettoization and persecution of the Jewish
community in Kaunas .... ." 734 F.2d at 626. The court of appeals did not rec-
ognize, however, that by holding that it is possible for a misrepresentation to
be material, even without establishing the existence of ultimate disqualifying
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As mayor of Kaunas, Palciauskas contributed substantially
to the Nazis' persecution efforts by helping to create the Jewish
ghetto and by expropriating and distributing Jewish property;
both steps were vital to the process culminating in the murder
of the ghettoized Jews.156 His acts thus fit easily within the
contribution approach. 57 Some of his acts, such as appropriat-
ing all Jewish owned property outside the ghetto, also fit fairly
well within the participation in persecution approach.158 To
characterize his most crucial act, ordering the ghetto's physical
enclosure with barbed wire, as persecutorial, however, it is nec-
essary to expand the category of persecutorial actors to include
persons who have ordered others to commit persecutorial acts.
2. Boleslavs Maikovskis
Maikovskis entered the United States in 1951 under the
terms of the amended 1948 Act.159 In his application for admis-
sion, he stated that from December 1941 to October 1944 he had
worked as a bookkeeper in Riga, Latvia.160 This misrepresenta-
tion concealed his service during that period as Chief of Police
in the Nazi-dominated Second Police Precinct in Rezekne,
Latvia.16' The Second Circuit affirmed a unanimous decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) ordering Maikovskis
deported.162
Maikovskis had volunteered for his position as Chief of Po-
lice in the Nazi-created police force.163 As Chief of Police, his
authority had extended to the village of Audrini, where, in De-
cember 1941, at least two Latvian police officers were killed by
Soviet partisans apparently harbored in Audrini. 164
facts, it decided the issue the Supreme Court refused to decide in Fedorenko-
the proper interpretation of Chaunt. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
156. It remains unclear whether the district court actually found that
Palciauskas was ineligible for a visa under § 2(b) of the 1948 Act because he
assisted in the persecution of civilians or whether the court relied exclusively
on some of the other legal bases identified in its Conclusions of Law. 559 F.
Supp. at 1300-01.
157. The contribution approach is discussed in text following note 105,
supra.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 106-108.
159. Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 438 (2d Cir. 1985), cer denied, 106 S.
Ct. 2915 (1986). See also supra note 25 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the 1948 Act.
160. 773 F.2d at 437.
161. Id. at 438.
162. Id. at 437.
163. Id
164. IH.
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Nazi authorities ordered that action be taken against Audrini, and, on
or about December 22, 1941, Maikovskis ordered his Latvian police to
join with German soldiers in arresting all of the Audrini villagers, to-
taling 200-300 men, women, and children; on or about January 2, 1942,
pursuant to Maikovskis's orders, his policemen assisted the Germans
in burning the village to the ground.165
Maikovskis denied any involvement in the subsequent retalia-
tory public execution of approximately 30 villagers in the
Rezekne market square and in the murder of the remaining vil-
lagers in the nearby Anchupani Hills.
16 6
Despite the absence of any finding that Maikovskis had
personally persecuted any person because of his political opin-
ions, the court of appeals had little difficulty in finding that his
actions constituted assistance in persecution.16 7 Under the con-
tribution approach,168 it is clear that a police chief, under the
direction of Nazis, who wanted to persecute villagers because of
their political opinions and who ordered his men to arrest the
villagers and burn their village, has assisted in persecution.
This result is evident under the participation-in-persecution ap-
proach,169 however, only if that approach is expanded to in-
clude those who order others to perform persecutorial acts.
The Second Circuit's summary rejection of the defendant's
claim that he had not assisted in persecution suggests that it
adopted the view that substantial contributions to persecution
wrought by an organized group constitute assistance.170
C. AN EXTREME VIEw: EDGAR LAIPENIEKS
Laipenieks entered the United States in 1960 under the
1952 Act and was never naturalized. 17 ' When he applied for a
visa, he concealed his past service with the Nazi-affiliated Lat-
vian Political Police (LPP).172 In an opinion that takes an ap-
proach diametrically opposed to that of Maikovskis, the Ninth
165. Id.
166. Id-
167. Id at 446.
168. For a discussion of the contribution approach, see supra text following
note 105.
169. The participation-in-persecution approach is discussed supra notes
106-108 and accompanying text.
170. The issue most seriously contested on appeal was the adequacy of the
Board's finding that the arrests and burning constituted persecution because of
political opinion, as opposed to being a form of brutal wartime reprisal. Judge
Newman dissented on this issue. 773 F.2d at 448.
171. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 434 (BIA 1983), rev'd sub nom.
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985).
172. 750 F.2d at 1429.
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Circuit reversed the Board's unanimous decision ordering
Laipenieks deported.173
In July 1941, Laipenieks joined a section of the Latvian
Auxiliary Police, the LPP, which the Nazis had formed and
controlled.174 Laipenieks rose to the position of an officer of
the LPP and was assigned the tasks of fighting against Jews
and communists. 175 Among other things, his duties included
conducting investigations of communist suspects, questioning
witnesses, and interrogating communist prisoners.176
The Board found that Laipenieks's activities as an investi-
gator and interrogator constituted assistance in persecution be-
cause they were "a necessary link" between the LPP and its
objects of persecution.177 in so deciding, the Board likened
Laipenieks to Osidach, the paid and armed interpreter for the
Ukrainian police.178 Significantly, the Board concluded that,
because Laipenieks was a higher level officer, his conduct
"presented an even stronger case of assistance than [that
presented] in Osidach."'1 79
The Ninth Circuit reversed. 8 0 Although the Government
had established that the LPP had been "involved in acts of per-
secution because of political beliefs," 18' it had failed to establish
that Laipenieks himself had been so involved or "at least that
Laipenieks' acts led to the persecution of individuals because of
political belief."'' 8 2 Thus, even if striking prisoners constituted
persecution, it was still necessary to establish "that this perse-
cution occurred because of the prisoner's political beliefs.' 83
Furthermore, it was not enough to show that the LPP or-
dered a prisoner's investigation solely because of his political
beliefs. It was necessary also to show that Laipenieks himself
struck a prisoner because of his own personal aversion to the
prisoner's political beliefs.'8 4 In so finding, the court resound-
173. Id. at 1435.
174. 18 I. & N. Dec. at 449.
175. Id
176. Id- at 450-51.
177. Id. at 465.
178. Id
179. Id.
180. 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
181. Id. at 1435.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1437 (emphasis in original).
184. The Ninth Circuit thus adopted the position rejected in Maikovskis, in
which the Second Circuit insisted that the "alien's personal motivation is not
paramount." 773 F.2d at 445.
[Vol. 71:97
ASSISTANCE IN PERSECUTION
ingly repudiated the Board's inquiry into "the objective effect of
actions" 185 in favor of a requirement of actual individual partic-
ipation in particular acts of persecution. Satisfication of such a
requirement is possible, in Laipenieks' case, only by showing
either that he had struck prisoners because of his own negative
attitude toward their political opinions, or that particular per-
sons he had investigated were ultimately persecuted because of
their political opinions.
Under the contribution approach, it is possible to maintain
that Laipenieks assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians be-
cause of their political opinions even if he never actually struck
any prisoners and even if none of the individuals he investi-
gated was ever ultimately persecuted. Suppose, for example,
that the Nazis had wanted to discover and eliminate all commu-
nists in the area, and that Laipenieks had not been an espe-
cially competent investigator. After the Nazis, or the LPP, had
made a preliminary determination as to which persons were
likely communist sympathizers or activists, they might have
had Laipenieks investigate the least likely cases, knowing that
they would probably not need to murder any of the persons he
investigated. Under these circumstances, Laipenieks' investiga-
tions, in his capacity as a member of the LPP, would have as-
sisted the Nazis in persecuting communists because of their
political opinions by freeing more competent LPP investigators
to investigate persons seriously suspected of being communists.
Thus, he would have contributed to persecution even though
the persons he investigated were never actually persecuted.
D. Two TRULY DIFFICULT CASES
Truly difficult cases arise when the correct result is un-
clear under either approach or when an individual, although he
voluntarily joined an organization that assisted the Nazis in
persecuting civilians, performed acts not themselves per-
secutorial and subsequently made only minimal contributions
to the organization. One such case is United States v.
Kowalchuk;1 8 6 another is United States v. Sprogis.8 7
185. 18 I. & N. Dec. at 465.
186. 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 488
(3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986).
187. CV-82-1804, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1984), affl'd, 763 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir. 1985).
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1. Sergei Kowalchuk
Kowalchuk entered the United States in 1949 under the
1948 Act and was naturalized in 1960. L88 When he applied for a
visa, Kowalchuk stated that during the German occupation of
the Ukraine he had lived in Kremianec and had worked as a
tailor, thus concealing his service with the Lubomyl militia.18 9
The district court held that, as a member of the Luboymyl
Schutzmannschaft, Kowalchuk had assisted in persecuting civil-
ians and consequently ordered his denaturalization. 190
Although the district court did not find that Kowalchuk
had personally participated in acts of persecution against
Jews,191 it concluded that he had assisted in persecution by vir-
tue of his relation to the Luboymyl Schutzmannschaft, an or-
ganization which clearly assisted the Nazis in their objective of
rendering the area judenfrei.192 Kowalchuk was not simply a
member of the Schutzmannschaft. He had "occupied a respon-
sible position, albeit largely clerical, within that organiza-
tion.1 93 The court found that even if Kowalchuk was unaware
of the Germans' intention to murder all the Jews of Lubomyl,
he was nonetheless aware of the responsibilities the Germans
assigned to the Schutzmannschaft and of atrocities its members
had committed against Jews.194 Finally, the clerical duties
Kowalchuk had performed contributed to the Schutzmann-
schaft's ability to efficiently assist the Nazis in persecuting
Jews. For the militia to function smoothly, someone had to
type and issue duty rosters and daily reports of police activity.
In the Lubomyl Schutzmannschaft, Kowalchuk had been that
person.
Although the Third Circuit affirmed, the court did not
reach the question whether Kowalchuk's acts constituted assist-
188. 571 F. Supp. at 74.
189. Id at 76.
190. Id at 82-83.
191. Id. at 81.
192. Id. at 82. The Luboymyl Schutzmannschaft, organized by the Nazis
shortly after their June 1941 invasion,
regularly and routinely enforced the martial law restrictions imposed
by the Germans, including beating Jews found outside the ghetto af-
ter curfew, beating or severely reprimanding Jews who failed to wear
the required insignia, assisting the Germans in confiscating valuables
from the Jewish inhabitants, arresting and participating in the harsh
punishment of persons involved in black-market activities or subver-
sive activities hostile to the German occupation forces ....
Id. at 81.
193. Id
194. Id
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ance in persecuting civilians.' 95 Chief Judge Aldisert's vigorous
dissent did address the question, however, and argued that
Kowalchuk's acts did not constitute assistance in persecution.
Judge Aldisert stressed that Kowalchuk "was not involved ac-
tively in any persecutions' ' z96 and that his responsibility was
"simply that of a clerk and not that of a decisionmaker."'' 97 In
arguing that the Fedorenko-Dercacz-Osidach line of cases
should not extend to encompass Kowalchuk, Judge Aldisert
compared Kowalchuk's conduct to that of persons who do not
seem morally responsible for having assisted in persecuting
civilians:
Can we say that the baker who delivered bread to the Lubomyl mili-
tia was guilty of assisting in Nazi persecutions? Or the charwoman or
janitor who cleaned the office where Kowalchuk toiled as a clerk? A
line must be drawn. Although to do so is a very difficult, if not ulti-
mately arbitrary, act, we are required to do so in this case whether we
affirm or reverse the district court.1 9 8
The Kowalchuk dissent demonstrates that even under the con-
tribution approach it remains difficult to determine whether an
individual has contributed enough to merit the attribution of
more than minimal moral responsibility for persecution.
2. Elmars Sprogis
Similarly, in United States v. Sprogis, 99 an individual who
performed largely clerical duties was found not to have assisted
in persecution. Sprogis entered the United States in 1950 under
the 1948 Act, as amended, and was naturalized in 1962.200 Un-
like other defendants in these difficult cases, he truthfully ac-
knowledged his wartime service as a Latvian police officer.
20
'
195. The Third Circuit affirmed on the grounds that because Kowalchuk
had voluntarily assisted the enemy, he was ineligible for a visa under § 2(b) of
the 1948 Act, and that he had procured his citizenship through a material mis-
representation. A panel of the Third Circuit originally reversed the district
court's denaturalization order. See United States v. Kowalchuk, 744 F.2d 301
(3d Cir. 1984) (withdrawn). This opinion was subsequently withdrawn and the
case was heard en banc. The majority had difficulty resolving the case and did
not reach the question of assistance in persecution. 773 F.2d 488, 494 (3d Cir.
1985). Additionally, the court's argument that Kowalchuk voluntarily assisted
the enemy, see id, is perfunctory and unsatisfactory, as the dissent properly
points out. See id at 508-10 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
196. 773 F.2d at 511.
197. Id
198. Id at 513.
199. No. CV-82-1804, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 115
(2d Cir. 1985).
200. No. CV-82-1804, slip op. at 1-2.
201. Id at 35.
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Sprogis voluntarily served as Assistant Chief of Police in
Gulbene, Latvia, from July 16, 1941, to August 10, 1941.202
When he arrived for work on July 19, 1941, he found nine Jews
in the duty policeman's room. 20 3 Sprogis thought that the Ger-
man Wehrmacht had arrested the nine solely because they
were Jewish. 2° 4 After the police took the rest of the nine Jews'
confiscated property to the mayor, Sprogis paid the remaining
100 rubles to the four farmers who had delivered the Jews.20 5
When a Latvian unit took the Jews from the duty officer in
Gulbene, Sprogis was fairly sure that they were going to be
shot, as indeed they were.20 6 Finally, Sprogis signed three forms
detailing the money and personal property confiscated from the
Jews and reflecting payments to the farmers who had reported
them.20 7 There was no proof, however, that Sprogis had or-
dered his men to detain the Jews at the Gulbene police
station.20 8
Another incident occurred in late July or early August of
1941 when Sprogis traveled in his official capacity to Litene to
witness the Germans' execution of an alleged communist.20 9 As
he was leaving the site after the execution, Sprogis saw a col-
umn of 100-150 people, guarded by several military units, walk-
ing toward the Litene summer camp.2 10 Sprogis did not
recognize any of the military personnel. 211 The next day, he
learned that the Arajs Commandos had shot all of the people
he had seen the previous day, most of whom were Jewish.212
These events occurred during the first sweep of the Nazis' mo-
bile killing units through Latvia.21 3
The district court found that the Government had failed to
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Sprogis had as-
sisted in persecution.21 4 In its opinion, the court emphasized
the ministerial nature of Sprogis's actions2 15 and that he had
202. Id at 36-37.
203. Id. at 44.
204. Id. at 45.
205. Id. at 39-42, 47-48.
206. Id. at 46.
207. Id at 39-42.
208. Id at 48.
209. Id. at 49.
210. Id. at 50.
211. Id at 46.
212. Id. at 83.
213. See R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 312.
214. No. CV-82-1804, slip op. at 84-85.
215. Id at 83.
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not personally participated in specific atrocities against Jewish
civilians.21 6 Thus, the court concluded:
While it is evident that Elmars Sprogis was physically present at
the events of July 19, 1941, and stood by when the Germans picked up
the nine Jews and watched a hundred or a hundred fifty men, women
and children being marched to an execution site, the Court does not
believe that Congress intended to exclude from citizenship persons
who were present when others were persecuted. We fear that after
the holocaust and the Second World War, there would have been very
few displaced persons eligible for citizenship if Congress so
intended.
2 17
In affirming, the Second Circuit observed that Sprogis's
acts of paying the farmers, signing the forms, and being present
at the police station "were not acts of oppression. They do not
amount to the kind of active assistance in persecution which
the DPA [1948 Act] condemns."2 1 8 The Second Circuit opinion
emphasized the inaccuracy of characterizing Sprogis's acts as
persecutorial, and it maintained that in each of the cases in
which courts had found assistance in persecution, "the individ-
ual condemned as a persecutor had actively participated in
some act of oppression directed against persecuted civilians." 219
The court concluded that to attribute liability for persecutorial
acts to Sprogis for the performance of "occasional ministerial
tasks" and for his "passive accommodation of the Nazis, . ..
would require the condemnation as persecutors of all those
who, with virtually no alternative, performed routine law en-
forcement functions during Nazi occupation." 220
Even if Sprogis committed no specific persecutorial acts,
however, under the contribution approach there is still a sense
in which he participated in persecution. Sprogis had played a
role in the confiscation and distribution of the nine Jews' prop-
erty,2 21 and he was present in his capacity as Assistant Chief of
Police when they were detained.222 If these facts are insuffi-
cient to conclude that he assisted in persecuting civilians, it is
only because the participation-in-persecution approach requires
some greater degree of participation that is difficult to define.
Although the Second Circuit emphasized that Sprogis had
216. Id. at 80.
217. Id at 85.
218. 763 F.2d at 122 (citing Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.
1985)).
219. Id- at 122.
220. Id, at 122-23.
221. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
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not personally committed persecutorial acts, it added that any
contribution he might have made to the Nazis' objective of kill-
ing Jews was simply too minimal to justify his "condemnation
as [a persecutor]." 223 Its claim that Sprogis's acts "do not
amount to the kind of active assistance in persecution which
the DPA [1948 Act] condemns," its distinction between "active
participation in persecution" and "Sprogis' passive accommoda-
tion of the Nazis," and its emphasis on the lack of evidence that
Sprogis had made any "decision to single out any person for
arrest and persecution" 224 indicate both that the magnitude of
an individual's contribution is relevant to whether he assisted
in persecution and that Sprogis's contribution was insufficient.
Each of these judgments has substantial plausibility. Although
Sprogis's acts might have assisted the Germans in efficiently
achieving their objective of rendering Latvia judenfrei, they
might, nevertheless, have made too insubstantial a contribution,
even in sum, to warrant holding Sprogis more than minimally
morally responsible.
IV. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
In addition to the inherently troubling nature of the assist-
ance-in-persecution cases, courts have difficulty determining
which acts to characterize as assistance in persecution. Courts
are relatively inexperienced at assigning individual responsibil-
ity for harm wrought by a large group over a period of years.
The paradigm of criminal responsibility is the individual actor
who has individually harmed identifiable persons. Even when
there is more than one actor and a differentiation of roles be-
tween principals and accomplices, the number of individuals in-
volved is usually small. The harm the Nazis wrought, however,
was of necessity accomplished by an organized effort integrat-
ing the actions of many individuals who themselves occupied
different roles in a variety of organizations. 225 A discussion of
223. 763 F.2d at 123.
224. Id. at 122.
225. R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 47, notes that in their concern to achieve
a Final Solution of the "Jewish problem," the Germans moved from street vio-
lence, exemplified in Kristallnacht (November 10, 1938), to more organized,
bureaucratic methods: "It is the bureaucratic destruction process [involving
four stages-identification, expropriation, concentration, and annihilation] that
in its step-by-step manner finally led to the annihilation of five million vic-
tims." Id. The Germans created or reorganized indigenous organizations, to
which many of the defendants in these cases belonged, so that the organiza-
tions could efficiently assist them in accomplishing their ultimate objective of
annihilating Jews. See also i&i at 993-94 (describing the gradual growth of the
[Vol. 71:97
ASSISTANCE IN PERSECUTION
what philosophers have said about individual responsibility in
this regard provides a useful framework for determining what
constitutes assistance in persecution.
A. INDIVIDuAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION
The groups the Nazis structured to accomplish their goal of
annihilating Jews, including the indigenous units to which
many of the previously discussed defendants belonged,226 were
of a type that philosophers call formal organizations, collectivi-
ties, or organized groups. 227 Such groups have an identity in-
dependent of the particular individuals who happen at any one
time to occupy roles within the group.228 These groups are hi-
erarchical, both horizontally and vertically, with a pyramid of
authority,229 and have an institutional structure, which usually
defines the methods by which the organizations choose courses
of collective action.230 Most importantly, such groups have a
purpose, and members' performance is evaluated in relation to
their contributions to that purpose.231
Attributions of responsibility for action or failure to act
arise in at least two contexts. In the first, we have in mind an
action or event and want to know to whom responsibility is at-
tributable. For example, a teacher returns to his first grade
class and finds a chair overturned. The teacher asks who is re-
sponsible. The answer may indicate a person, animal, or in-
aminate object, for example, the wind. Assigning responsibility
in this sense carries with it no implication of moral blame or
answerability. 232
terror from seemingly isolated events into an unprecedented five million
murders).
226. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
227. A leading article is Ladd, supra note 10. See also French, Types of Col-
lectivities and Blame, 56 THE PERSONALIST 160, 160-65 (1975) (distinguishing
aggregate from conglomerate collectivities); Gruner, On the Action of Social
Groups, 19 INQUIRY 443, 446-48 (1976) (distinguishing non-institutionalized as-
semblies from structured, goal-oriented institutions). See generally Held, Can
a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible? 67 J. PHIL. 471
(1971) (distinguishing collectivity/organized group from random collection of
individuals).
228. French, supra note 227, at 164.
229. Ladd, supra note 10, at 489.
230. French, supra note 227, at 164.
231. Gruner, supra note 227, at 448; Ladd, supra note 10, at 495-96.
232. J. FEINBERG, Action and Responsibility, in DOING AND DESERVING 119,
138 n.17 (1970), refers to such judgments of responsibility as ones of "proper
identifiability." See also H. HART, Postscript. Responsibility and Retribution,
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In the second context, we have both the action or event
and the human actor in mind and want to know to what extent
the actor is morally blameworthy or morally obliged to make
amends. Thus, the relevant inquiry considers not only the ac-
tor's causal relation to the harm, but also such factors as the ac-
tor's knowledge and ability to control his conduct.233
Assignment of responsibility in this sense carries with it the
implication that the actor must answer 234 or account 235 for his
conduct, and that he is properly blameworthy when he should
and could have acted differently.236
Philosophers also have examined whether moral responsi-
bility assigned to formal organizations is "non-distributive. 237
Although a group's responsibility for an occurrence may not
"distribute" to each of its members for their actions in bringing
about that occurrence, it does not follow that responsibility for
that occurrence is not assignable to particular individuals, in-
cluding members of the group.238 Thus, even if the moral re-
in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 210, 214-15 (1968) (discussing "causal re-
sponsibility"); French, supra note 8, at 268-72 (discussing non-moral blame).
233. H. HART, supra note 232, at 225.
234. Id. at 264-65.
235. J. FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 226. See also Pennock, The Problem of
Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY 3, 6 (C. Friedrich ed. 1960) (discussing the
notion of accountability).
236. See H. HART, supra note 232, at 225; cf. French, supra note 232, at 273-
76 (discussing moral blame).
237. Group responsibility is "distributive" when it "is simply the sum of all
the individual responsibility." J. FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 243. It is "non-
distributive" when it is "more than the sum of the responsibility of its mem-
bers." Id. at 248.
238. Some, although not all, of the group's moral responsibility for an oc-
currence may distribute to members for their actions in bringing about the oc-
currence. P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 112-13
(1984) (a finding of non-distributive collective responsibility for an occurrence
does not exonerate all the individuals in the collective of responsibility for
their actions in bringing about the occurrence).
The non-distributive responsibility is assignable to the individuals consti-
tuting the group, not for acts they perform in their group roles, but for their
acts of choosing to become members or to remain members once they become
fully aware of the group's objective. See Held, supra note 227, at 475; see also
Downie, Social Roles and Moral Responsibility, 39 PHIL. 29, 35 (1964) (discuss-
ing responsibility for having accepted or remained in a role).
Finally, responsibility is attributable to individuals who are not group
members, for example, to individuals or groups benefiting from the existence
of the group and contributing to maintaining its existence. See, e.g., Benjamin,
Can Moral Responsibility Be Collective and Nondistributive 4 Soc. THEORY
& PRAC. 93 (1976) (responsibility of collective is understandable in terms of re-
sponsibility of non-members who maintain collective's existence); Downie, Col-
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sponsibility of a group is non-distributive, it is still necessary to
determine each individual member's moral responsibility.
As with criminal responsibility, a group member is morally
responsible only if there are present both an actus reus, primar-
ily in the form of the member's contribution to achieving the
group's objective, and certain mens rea, primarily in the form
of knowledge. 239 When a group can achieve its objectives only
by the coordinated activities of many members occurring over a
period of time, the central actus reus issue is to determine any
particular individual's contribution to the overall undertak-
ing.240 In making this determination, Joel Feinberg asserts the
need to consider such "incommensurable" factors as degrees of
initiative, difficulty or causal crucialness of assigned tasks, de-
grees of authority, and percentage of benefit received.
241
Another important question concerning individual contri-
butions to group actions is how to treat actual membership in a
group.242 It is plausible to characterize knowing, voluntary and
active membership in a group in terms of the contribution,
however minimal, the individual thereby makes to achieving
the group's purpose.243 By becoming a member, an individual
has voluntarily placed himself in a position to assist the group
in obtaining its objective. Naturally, the group turns first to its
members when in need of someone to contribute, and is justifi-
ably harsher in its judgment of a member than of a nonmember
lective Responsibility, 44 PHIL. 66 (1969) (moral responsibility of collective is
traceable to individuals who are not members of the collective).
239. Adolf Eichmann was well aware of these two conditions for responsi-
bility. In his interrogation by the Israeli Police prior to his trial, he stated: "I
never claimed not to know about this liquidation. I only said that Bureau IV B
4 had nothing to do with it." Eichmann Interrogated 82 (J. von Lang ed. 1984).
240. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 246; see also Lewis, Collective Re-
sponsibility, 23 PHIL. 3, 13 (1948) (guilt of each member is strictly proportion-
ate to his part in the joint undertaking).
241. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 246.
242. Both Held, supra note 227, at 475, and Downie, Collective Responsibil-
ity, supra note 238, at 68, believe that it is possible to hold an individual mor-
ally responsible merely for joining, or retaining membership in, a collective.
See also Walsh, Pride, Shame & Responsibility, 20 PHIL. Q. 1, 10 (1970) (dis-
cussing the doctrine of tacit consent to joining or retaining membership in the
collective).
243. Another explanation of the moral relevance of a person's voluntarily
joining a group and retaining membership while knowing its purpose is that it
helps to evaluate that person's character. We learn about a person's identity
by knowing what objectives are paramount in the groups that person has
joined. By such information, we hope to find an explanation for why an indi-
vidual with apparently good moral character joined only groups with goals
that involve harming others.
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for failure to contribute. Similarly, the number of active mem-
bers in a group is usually a factor for consideration when a
group is deciding which course of action it will pursue. Like-
wise, the group's members create the atmosphere or dynamic of
the group, and that atmosphere is, in large part, responsible for
determining whether the group will pursue its objective suc-
cessfully. Because certain activities, such as waging war or kill-
ing large numbers of people, are successful only if attempted
through organized group effort, some moral responsibility may
attach to an individual member merely because the individual
voluntarily joined and retained membership in the group while
knowing of the group's objectives. 2 "
A problem the assistance-in-persecution cases raise is that,
even when all the various indicia of contribution are taken into
account, the defendant's own contribution to achieving the
group's objective may seem minimal. Kowalchuk's contribu-
tion, for example, was limited to clerical work for the police
and to membership in the Schutzmannschaft. 245 Philosophers
troubled by this problem seek ways to determine individual
moral responsibility for small contributions. 246
John Ladd notes that where the contribution of any partic-
ular group member to a collective action is neither necessary
nor sufficient, each member may seek to deny moral responsi-
bility.247 To deal with this problem, Ladd suggests rejecting the
assimilation of moral to causal responsibility.248 It would then
follow that a person involved in a collective action is morally
responsible even though his actions were neither causally nec-
essary nor sufficient.249 Thus, it becomes possible "to assess the
actions of any particular official on [individual] merits without
regard to the other causal factors contributing to the final
result."250
244. This argument establishes only that the mere fact of active group
membership itself might constitute a form of contribution, not that member-
ship with no other contribution suffices to justify assigning a high degree of
moral responsibility for the group's acts. Cf. Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435,
446 (2d Cir. 1985) (mere membership sufficient), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2915
(1986).
245. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
246. Thus, philosophers have properly rejected the approach taken by the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, which regarded less than sub-
stantial participation in certain activities as equivalent to no contribution at
all. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 264-65 n.59.
247. See Ladd, supra note 10, at 514.
248. Id. at 515.
249. Id. at 514-15.
250. Id. at 515.
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The problem with Ladd's approach is two-fold. First, it is
important to maintain the connection between moral and
causal responsibility. Ladd suggests, however, that it is neces-
sary to repudiate the assimilation of moral to causal responsi-
bility because, although the actions of the individuals in an
organization together "make up the rope, ... any particular
strand is dispensable. '251 The dispensability of any particular
contribution does not, however, require accepting the premise
that any particular individual has made no causal contribution.
Because every contributor could say that his contribution was
dispensable, the end result of Ladd's approach is an outcome
for which no one is held even partially causally responsible.
The ramifications of this result are contrary to even the nar-
rowest view of individual accountability for contribution to col-
lective effort. Ladd's problematic argument demonstrates the
need for a better understanding of the attributions of causal re-
sponsibility for collective actions and not, as Ladd suggests, to a
rejection of the connection between causal and moral
responsibility.
The second problem with Ladd's approach is evident in his
assertion that it is possible to assess a particular official's ac-
tions individually without regard to other contributing causal
factors: should we want to assess a particular individual's con-
tribution without regard to other contributing causal factors?
The distinctive nature of collective efforts is that the result is
achieved by combining individual contributions, which alone
are neither causally necessary nor sufficient. In such a context,
proper evaluation of an act is impossible without knowing how
it combined with the acts of others and what the actor knew
about those combinations and their effects.
Derek Parfit has developed a moral theory which explicitly
takes account of the way that the contributions of many indi-
viduals can combine to produce substantial harm or benefit.
252
He contrasts two ways in which victims experience the same
amount of suffering:
The Bad Old Days. A thousand torturers have a thousand victims. At
the start of each day, each of the victims is already feeling mild pain.
Each of the torturers turns a switch a thousand times on some instru-
ment. Each turning of a switch affects some victim's pain in a way
that is imperceptible. But, after each torturer has turned his switch a
thousand times, he has inflicted severe pain on his victim....
The Harmless Torturers. In the Bad Old Days, each torturer in-
251. Id at 514.
252. See D. PARFrr, REASONS AND PERSONS 67-86 (1984).
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flicted severe pain on one victim. Things have now changed. Each of
the thousand torturers presses a button, thereby turning the switch
once on each of the thousand instruments. The victims suffer the
same severe pain. But none of the torturers makes any victim's pain
perceptibly worse.253
Parfit argues that there is no morally significant difference
between these two cases. Each Harmless Torturer acts just as
wrongly as he did as a torturer in the Bad Old Days. The ex-
planation for Parfit's conclusion appeals to what the torturers
together do, and says that "[e]ven if each harms no one, they
together impose great suffering on a thousand victims." 2 54
From these two examples, Parfit derives the principle that
when an individual knows that his actions, in combination with
the actions of others, will produce harm, he should not act,
even when his actions, in isolation, would have insignificant ef-
fects.255 Thus, a particular act is wrong because of its effects,
even though the act on an individual level is seemingly insignif-
icant, because the relevant effects include both the effects of
the particular act as well as the effects of the set of acts to
which the particular act belongs.2 56
Although Parfit does not state his conclusions in terms of
moral responsibility, their relevance to that issue is clear.257
Rather than ignoring apparently small or de minimus contribu-
tions, it is preferable to examine the way a particular person's
contributions connect with those of other members to achieve
the group's overall purpose. It is also necessary to be alert to
the various ways in which contributions are made. For exam-
ple, one member's acts may combine with different types of
acts performed by other members to more efficiently achieve
the group's ultimate objective.258
253. Id at 80.
254. Id at 81.
255. Id.
256. Parfit labels as the Second Mistake in Moral Mathematics the claim:
"If some act is right or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects
are the effects of this particular act." Id. at 70 (emphasis in original).
257. Parfit states his conclusions in terms of what a person ought to do. If,
by failing to do what he or she ought to do, a person contributes to harming
others, it is plausible to say that the person is morally responsible for having
made that contribution. Parfit's examples involve "heaps" and continuous
amounts of, for example, pain and beans on a person's plate. See id& at 511
n.44. Although his claims are most convincing within such cases, they are still
applicable when the contributions of each person are varied and connect in di-
verse ways with the contributions of others.
258. Efficiency is especially important in judging contributions to Nazi war
crimes because of the Nazis' objectives. The Nazis aspired to destroy all Jews
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The crucial mens rea factors involved in determining
whether a particular individual contributed to the group's
harmful objectives are the individual's knowledge and the vol-
untariness of his actions.259 The knowledge factor suggests that
moral responsibility for acts performed by a group to which a
person belongs and contributes is attributable to that person
only if he knew or should have known both the group's objec-
tives and the way his actions contributed to achieving those
objectives.260 Although courts have emphasized the former ele-
ment,26 ' they have not explicitly dealt with the latter. Perhaps
courts have overlooked the latter element on the assumption
that the defendants should have known or been aware of how
their acts contributed to achieving the group's ultimate
objectives.
The second mens rea consideration is the voluntariness of
the individual's acts in joining the group, retaining member-
ship, and performing the tasks assigned to him. 262 Moral re-
sponsibility typically is attributable when the individual was
free to do or not to do the act.263 Plausibly, a member is not
responsible if he was coerced into joining the group or doing
in Europe while simultaneously fighting a world war. Such an ambitious plan
demanded efficiency.
259. Mens rea considerations relevant in other contexts are not typically
relevant in these cases. No defendant has attempted to avoid liability on the
ground that he lacked what Hart calls "capacity responsibility." See H. HART,
supra note 232 at 227-30. Although it is a necessary condition of attributing
moral responsibility to defendants that they intended their acts, it is not neces-
sary that they intended thereby to harm anyone. See Ardal, Motives, Inten-
tions and Responsibility, 15 PHIL. Q. 146, 148-51 (1965). Similarly, it is not
necessary for a group member to possess bad motives for moral responsibility
to attach to that person's contributions to the group's objective. See id. at 153-
54 (contending that "intentionality is not a necessary condition for
responsibility").
260. The second condition is necessary because it is possible that a member
was aware of the group's objectives and, yet, was justifiably unaware of the
manner in which his actions contributed to their furtherance. The Nazis, ea-
ger to avoid the psychological problems that would arise if the individuals who
assisted them became fully aware of the nature of their acts, sought for ways
to obscure this awareness. R. HILBERG, supra note 54, describes an example in
which the Judenrat of a Latvian village tried to make it easier for a nurse to
kill Jewish premature babies by telling her "to proceed in such a way that she
would not know the nature of her act." Id. at 1035.
261. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 81 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (defendant must have known that Schutzmannschaft was carrying out
harsh repressive measures), aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir.
1985)(en banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986).
262. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 246.
263. See Freund, Responsibility-Definitions, Distinctions, and Applica-
tions in Various Contexts, in RESPONSIBILITY 28, 37 (C. Friedrich ed. 1960).
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the particular act.26 A crucial problem in determining volunta-
riness in these contexts is deciding what type of behavior is rea-
sonable to expect of individuals. It is necessary to ascertain
which threats of harm it is reasonable to expect individuals not
to succumb to so as to avoid contributing to harming others,
and which features of a situation are relevant in determining
what behavior is reasonable. These questions are beyond the
scope of this Article, because in Fedorenko the Supreme Court
ruled that a defendant need not have assisted the Nazis volun-
tarily in persecuting civilians.265
B. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ASSISTANCE IN PERSECUTION
This discussion of the principles of individual and collective
responsibility can provide courts with a framework within
which to determine whether conduct constitutes assistance in
persecution.266 Although the statutory language does not itself
refer to moral responsibility,267 the concern that persons re-
sponsible for persecution not enjoy the benefits of United
States citizenship underlies all the various statutory
formulations.
If a court finds that a defendant's own acts were per-
But see J. FEINBERG, supra note 232, at 149-50 (arguing that "voluntariness in
this sense has no direct and invariant connection with liability").
264. See J. FEINBERG, supra note 12, at 248 ("The man who 'cooperates'
with crime under duress is surely in a different position from the man who
cooperates . . . as the result of a bribe."); cf. Cooper, Responsibility and the
"System," in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 81, 88-91 (P. French
ed. 1972) ("One cannot reasonably expect a man to sacrifice friendship, the
welfare of his family, or even his home, by standing out against what has be-
come the accepted and normal practice in his township."); Wasserstrom, The
Relevance of Nuremburg, supra note 14, at 32-33 ("One interpretation of
'moral choice' would focus heavily on the degree of choice exercisable by the
actor.").
265. See supra text accompanying notes 86-103.
266. Although an understanding of the principles of individual and collec-
tive responsibility can assist courts in determining what constitutes assistance
in persecution, caution is necessary when drawing implications from the pre-
ceding discussion. Moral responsibility is a matter of degree. Cf. J. FEINBERG,
supra note 12, at 245-46 ("The problem of determining degree of responsibility
of individuals in joint undertakings... is assessing the extent of each individ-
ual's contribution."). Courts, on the other hand, must make an all-or-nothing
decision whether the individual's conduct amounted to assistance in persecu-
tion and, on that basis, decide whether the defendant should be denaturalized
or deported. Situations may arise in which the defendant is morally responsi-
ble for assisting in persecution. If that defendant assisted only minimally,
however, such conduct will fall below the legal standard of having "assisted in
persecution."
267. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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secutorial, the inquiry should end there. Persecutorial acts and
personal participation in persecution are not easy to define,
however, and courts have expanded the definitions in various
ways.268 A defendant need not have personally committed
atrocities or crimes against identifiable victims. Nevertheless,
there must be a sufficiently close connection-how close is un-
clear-between the defendant's conduct and the persecution.
Beyond these two claims, little else is clear about this
approach.26 9
Analyzing these cases is easier if personal participation in
persecution is limited to two situations: either the individual's
acts were clearly persecutorial, as evidenced by direct contacts
with civilians which caused obvious physical or psychological
harm, or the individual directly ordered others to have such
harmful contacts with civilians. Under this analysis, the acts of
a camp guard and of an individual who evicted Jews from their
homes, confiscated their property, and concentrated them in a
ghetto would constitute personal participation in persecution.
On the other hand, the acts of someone like Osidach, in his
function as an interpreter, or of Kowalchuk, in his function as a
clerk, would not constitute personal participation.
Although personal participation in acts of persecution is
sufficient to constitute assistance in persecution, courts should
not treat it as necessary.2 70 Many individuals who bear substan-
268. See supra notes 109-112 for cases addressing this issue.
269. Some courts have suggested that an individual may participate in per-
secution by ordering others to commit persecutorial acts even though the indi-
vidual's own acts are not themselves persecutorial. See, e.g., United States v.
Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 1985) (assistance in persecution includes or-
dering others to arrest or shoot detained civilians).
The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982), referring to those who "or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any per-
son or group of persons because of race, religion or national origin . .. "
supports the view that ordering persecution is a form of participation in perse-
cution. This statutory formulation, however, is not especially helpful in decid-
ing the difficult cases. It indicates that ordering, inciting, and assisting are
ways of participating in persecution. While this is technically accurate, it con-
flicts with the ordinary usage of these terms, in which orders to persecute or
to assist in persecution are typically distinguished from personal participation.
270. Insisting that personal participation in persecution is necessary for a
finding of assistance in persecution renders the "assist" component of the stat-
utory language otiose. If the individual's acts were themselves persecutorial,
that resolves the matter. If they were not, that likewise concludes the inquiry.
Consequently, the question of assistance is never reached. Given that the col-
lective to which the individual belonged and contributed had persecution as an
objective, did the individual assist in that persecution, even though his own
particular acts were not themselves persecutorial? By using the term "assist,"
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tial moral responsibility for persecuting civilians, as a result of
their contributions to a group effort with that objective, have
never personally committed acts of persecution.2 7 1 Therefore,
even if a court determines that a defendant has not personally
participated in acts of persecution, it could nevertheless find
that the individual assisted in persecuting civilians.272
Because most of the defendants in the previously discussed
cases allegedly assisted in persecution by virtue of their duties
as members of organizations, 273 a court must determine what
role the Nazis assigned the organization, how much control the
Nazis exercised over it, and how effective the organization was
in helping the Nazis achieve their objective of persecuting civil-
ians. If a court finds that the organization assisted the Nazis in
persecuting civilians, the court should then determine the ex-
the statutory language anticipates that on some occasions it is important to ask
this question.
Requiring personal participation implicitly sanctions the form of moral
reasoning used by the commander of Einsatzgruppe D, Ohlendorf, who, in or-
der to avoid personal responsibility, demanded that his team of murderers stop
shooting large numbers of Jews in the neck and ordered them instead to em-
ploy "massed fire from a considerable distance." R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at
319.
271. Adolf Eichmann is a good example. Although Eichmann himself may
never have directly persecuted Jews or ordered others to do so, he certainly
bears a large share of moral responsibility for persecuting Jews, because of his
substantial contributions to Nazi objectives. Eichmann advised the collecting
centers on how to meet their "quotas." He ensured that adequate trains were
available to transport Jews to death camps. He consulted with the local
Judenrat. Moreover, he knew the fate of those Jews he sent to "the East." It
is unnecessary to show that someone like Eichmann personally participated in
acts of persecution to explain his moral responsibility for the death of count-
less Jews. Likewise, many others, equally free of personal participation in
persecution, may share in that moral responsibility to an extent commensu-
rate with their contributions.
272. But see A. RYAN, supra note 2, at 248. Ryan offers two reasons for
limiting cases to those in which "the defendant himself personally took part
in, or incited, the persecution of which he stood accused."
First, I wanted no witch-hunts, prosecuting people whose actual guilt
was uncertain. And second, I believed that no judge in America
would deport a middle-aged or elderly man (or woman) who had lived
in the United States for thirty years for no reason other than that he
had once been a fascist and had lied on some application forms.
Id at 249.
The Eichmann example shows, however, that even if a person has not per-
sonally taken part in persecution his guilt is not necessarily uncertain, nor
need the attempt to prosecute such individuals constitute a "witch-hunt." As
for the second reason, judges are sensitive to the wide spectrum of responsibil-
ity between mere membership in an organization that persecuted civilians and
personal participation in acts of persecution. See supra note 271.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 116-213.
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tent of the defendant's individual contribution to the
organization.
Measuring individual contribution requires a consideration
of factors such as the degree of initiative required, the difficulty
or causal crucialness of assigned tasks, degrees of authority, and
the Nazis' estimate of the defendant's contribution as mani-
fested by wages and privileges.274 Courts should treat the fact
of membership in an organization that had as an objective the
persecution of civilians as a contribution, but one which, in the
absence of other contributions, is insufficient to justify finding
that the defendant assisted in persecution.275 Even so, courts
should not ignore apparently small contributions on the as-
sumption that they are insignificant.276 They should sensitively
evaluate the way seemingly minor contributions would predict-
ably combine with the acts of others to produce great harm.
2 77
If a court finds that a defendant's contribution was more
than minimal, it should next consider whether that person
knew that the organization persecuted Jews and that his ac-
tions contributed to achieving that objective. If all these condi-
tions are satisfied, the court should conclude that the defendant
assisted in persecuting civilians.278
274. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 277, 278.
276. I&
277. In context, for example, the egregiousness of Dercacz's actions in re-
porting Jews not wearing arm-bands to police authorities and the Gestapo be-
comes obvious. Hilberg says of the system of identification:
The whole identification system, with its personal documents,
specially assigned names, and conspicuous tagging in public, was a
powerful weapon in the hands of the police. First, the system was an
auxiliary device which facilitated the enforcement of residence and
movement restrictions. Second, it was an independent control mea-
sure in that it enabled the police to pick up any Jew, anywhere, any-
time. Third, and perhaps most important, identification had a
paralyzing effect on its victims. The system induced the Jews to be
even more docile, more responsive to command than before. The
wearer of the star was exposed; he thought that all eyes were fixed
upon him. It was as though the whole population had become a police
force, watching him and guarding his actions. No Jew, under those
conditions, could resist, escape, or hide without first ridding himself of
the conspicuous tag, the revealing middle name, the tell-tale ration
card, passport, and identification papers. Yet the riddance of these
burdens was dangerous, for the victim could be recognized and de-
nounced. Few Jews took the chance. The vast majority wore the star
and, wearing it, were lost.
R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 179-80.
278. Applying these criteria, courts can find that a defendant assisted in
persecution even though the defendant is not morally responsible for assisting
in persecution. This is the case if the defendant was forced to render assist-
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This approach has definite implications for some of the dif-
ficult cases. For example, under this approach, the outcome in
Laipenieks is different. Even assuming that Laipenieks's acts
did not themselves constitute personal participation in persecu-
tion, they nonetheless contributed substantially to achieving
the LPP's objectives, which included persecuting civilians be-
cause of their political opinions.2 7 9 Moreover, Laipenieks was
aware not only that the LPP persecuted civilians because of
their political opinions but also that his actions contributed to
achieving that objective.280 Additionally, using this approach,
Laipenieks's personal motivation for acting, which was of ut-
most importance to the Ninth Circuit in deciding this case, is
irrelevant in view of his contributions to an organization which
had as its objective the persecution of civilians because of their
political opinions.
In contrast, the court in Osidach281 properly concluded
that the defendant assisted in persecution. In terms of this
framework, however, it would not have found that his duties as
an interpreter constituted personal participation in persecution.
Rather, the court could have held Osidach responsible for
assistance in persecution because he substantially contributed
to the Nazis' objective of rendering Galicia judenfrei. Addition-
ally, Osidach knew that the Nazis had this objective, that they
expected the Ukrainian police to assist them in reaching their
objective, and that his own activities, as an interpreter and
member of that police force, helped them to achieve their
objective.
Although this framework has obvious implications for
some difficult cases, it is not an algorithm. Any expectations
ance or, possibly, if it was necessary for the defendant to render assistance in
order to save other potential victims from harm, for example, by being in a
better position to shelter them. Given the Court's treatment of the voluntari-
ness issue in Fedorenko, it follows that a defendant is not necessarily morally
responsible for assisting in persecution in order for the Court to hold that
assistance was rendered. Greater congruity between the legal and moral stan-
dards for finding assistance in persecution is attainable by treating satisfaction
of the criteria suggested in the text as constituting a prima-facie case that the
defendant assisted in persecution. The burden would then shift to the defend-
ant to establish that the conduct amounting to assistance was coerced or
justified.
279. See supra notes 174-185 and accompanying text.
280. See Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427, 1441 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[He] admit-
ted that he personally investigated all kinds of communists, and acknowledged
that some were imprisoned solely on grounds of political beliefs.").
281. See supra text accompanying notes 128-144 for a discussion of this
case.
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for a simple, all-inclusive solution to these difficult problems
are groundless. Kowalchuk,2 2 for example, remains a deeply
troubling case. Because Kowalchuk's acts were not themselves
persecutorial, the question remains whether his contributions
to the Nazis' objective of persecution were anything more than
minimal. It helps to address this question in terms of the indi-
cia of contribution this Article previously identified.
28 3
Kowalchuk's tasks required no more than a minimum of
initiative. Adequately performing them required average com-
petence. The Schutzmannschaft could have assisted the Nazis
in persecuting civilians even without a member whose duty it
was to type duty rosters and daily police reports. It would have
done so, however, with less efficiency and effect than it did
with Kowalchuk's contribution. As for Kowalchuk's authority,
although his was a position "of some responsibility," the re-
sponsibility was that "of a clerk and not that of a deci-
sionmaker. ' ' 28 4  Furthermore, he was one of only three
Schutzmannschaft members with his own office, and the Nazis
sent him away for further training. This indicates that, in the
Nazis' estimation, Kowalchuk was a valuble employee and his
contribution was more than minimal. Additionally, although
his primary duties were clerical, as an active member of the
Schutzmannschaft he presumably had to be available to per-
form other tasks. Finally, his contributions combined with
those of others. Kowalchuk interacted with the person from
whom he received orders and with those who performed their
daily duties on the basis of the rosters he typed. Taking these
factors together, it is reasonable to conclude that Kowalchuk's
contributions were more than minimal and, thus, to find that
he did assist in persecuting civilians. The case is very close,
however, and it is equally reasonable to conclude that
Kowalchuk's contributions were only minimal. 28 5
282. See supra text accompanying notes 188-198.
283. See supra notes 273-278 and accompanying text.
284. 773 F.2d at 511 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
285. Analyzing Kowalchuk's contribution in terms of the factors suggested
in this Article demonstrates why his case is different from those of the baker
and the charwoman. See supra text accompanying note 198. The application
of many of the factors to the latter two confirms that their contribution to the
Nazis' objective was considerably less than Kowalchuk's. By comparison, the
town baker's contribution was more discrete and focused. Admittedly, the Na-
zis and the schutzmannschaft needed bread. Yet the Nazis could call on the
baker only for bread. In contrast to a member of the Schutzmannschaft, the
baker would not have had to be available and ready to assist the organization
in any way when called upon. Taking all the factors into account, neither the
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V. THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
The philosophical discussion of individual moral responsi-
bility for group action, and its application to the cases, does not
directly address the question whether the United States should
continue to expend money and resources2 6 to identify, denatu-
ralize, and deport individuals who occupied low-level positions
within the Nazi hierarchies or their collaborating organiza-
tions.28 7 This question becomes more poignant given the fact
that the defendants, in most cases, have led unobtrusive, law-
abiding lives since coming to the United States as many as
thirty-five years ago.288 Most are old; some are ill and near
death. Although the Supreme Court has declared that equita-
ble defenses, including laches and estoppel, are unavailable to
defendants in individual cases, 28 9 it is still appropriate to ask
whether the Government is justified in supporting a unit, the
OSI, whose purpose is to identify, denaturalize, and deport
these individuals.290 For reasons including those just men-
baker nor the charwoman made more than minimal contributions to the Na-
zis' objective. Thus, neither of them assisted in persecution.
286. The district court in Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 899, emphasized the
large expenses the Government incurred in prosecuting the case. A. RYAN,
supra note 2, at 61, notes that Congress initially appropriated $2.3 million for
the OSI when it was formed in 1979.
287. Subsequent events in the Sprogis case reveal that there is a potentially
high and incalculable cost to the Government's efforts to identify and prose-
cute those who it believes assisted the Nazis in persecuting civilians, even
when courts find in the defendant's favor. On Friday, September 6, 1985, a
bomb exploded at the Long Island home of Elmars Sprogis, a former Latvian
policeman accused and acquitted of Nazi war crimes. The Jewish Defense
League claimed responsibility for the blast, which seriously injured a by-
stander who, upon seeing flames, rushed to the house to warn Sprogis. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 7, 1985, at 25, col. 2. Ultimately, the bystander faced permanent
disability and the state paid the high medical costs.
288. See, e.g., United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("Since coming to this country [defendant] has led an unremarkable
life."), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986);
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 896, 920-21 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (de-
fendant is "a man who is not interested in 'making waves' or causing trouble"),
rev'd, 597 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
289. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 516-18.
290. Denaturalization and deportation are civil penalties, thereby making it
technically incorrect to speak of "punishment." Courts have held that because
defendants are not technically threatened with punishment, they are not con-
stitutionally protected against cruel and unusual punishment, or against bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws. See Note, Toward a Constitutional Defini-
tion of Punishment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1667 (1980) (concluding that de-
portation of aliens is not punishment). Nevertheless, being denaturalized and
deported under these circumstances constitutes a severe form of treatment
sharing many of the characteristics of punishment. Packer claims, for exam-
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tioned, numerous groups have called for the imposition of a
statute of limitations on the charges the OSI brings.291 The re-
mainder of this Article addresses these two questions and the
related arguments.
A. ABOLISH THE OSI
1. Forget
One argument made to support the abolition of the OSI is
that everyone, Jews included, should simply forget the Holo-
caust and get on with life. The OSI should not exist, therefore,
because its existence impedes forgetting. This argument ig-
nores the possibility that forgetting an occurrence before fully
realizing its moral implications and adequately dealing with
them is morally irresponsible.
What counts as dealing with an occurrence depends on the
nature of that occurrence. In the case of a promise, for exam-
ple, performance or some other means of discharging the prom-
ised act must occur before it is correct to say that the promise
has been dealt with. Similarly, in the case of an event such as
the Holocaust, it is plausible to refuse to forget until those who
ple, that "[t]he deportation of an alien, under our present legal arrangements,
is punishment but not criminal punishment." H. PACKER, THE LimIrrs OF THE
CRIINAL SANCTION 35, 35 (1968). See also Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (contending that the only dis-
tinction between civil and criminal sanctions is the judgment of community
condemnation); Moeller, United States Treatment of Alleged Nazi War
Criminals: International Law, Immigration Law, and the Need for Interna-
tional Cooperation, 25 VA. J. INT'L LAw 793, 819 (1985) (discussing this issue as
it specifically relates to Nazi war criminals).
The Court does draw some distinction between denaturalization and de-
portation cases. Because denaturalization results in the deprivation of a legal
right, it constitutes punishment. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 164-66 (1963) (holding unconstitutional draft evasion sanctions which
employ loss of citizenship as a punishment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103,
105 (1958) (five justices holding that involuntary divestment of citizenship
upon court martial for desertion is unconstitutional).
Even when it asserts that deportation suits do not strictly result in punish-
ment, the Court nevertheless acknowledges similarities between their sanc-
tions and punishment. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 ("The
intrinsic consequences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime"),
reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 852 (1954); Barber v. Gonzalez, 347 U.S. 637, 642 (1954)
("Although not penal in character, deportation statutes as a practical matter
may inflict 'the equivalent of banishment or exile' ... and should be strictly
construed.").
291. See, e.g., Washington Post, April 6, 1985, at A9, col. 1 (reporting meet-
ing between attorneys for emigre groups and Justice Department to discuss
statute of limitations on deportation actions for Nazi involvement).
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are responsible are dealt with or brought to account to the ex-
tent that it is still possible. It is the burden of the advocates of
forgetfulness to show, in the face of the lingering moral impli-
cations of the Holocaust, that society has adequately and fully
dealt with those implications.2 92
2. Forgive
Another argument made to support the disbanding of the
OSI is that society should forgive the perpetrators of the Holo-
caust. Against this argument, Martin Golding maintains that
some wrongs "need not, may not, be forgiven. Such wrongs
may be extremely rare, but if anything is a wrong of this order
it is the German's destruction of the Jews. '2 93 A characteristic
of wrongs of this magnitude is that, from the perpetrator's per-
spective, it is impossible ever to make adequate amends. Simi-
larly, from the victim's perspective, the inexcusability of the
wrong makes it difficult, if not impossible, to forgive.2 94
When making this claim, Golding uses the singular "Ger-
man" and "wrong. '295 The OSI, however, is concerned with
particular defendants who were involved in particular instances
of wrongdoing and not with attempting to right the total wrong
inflicted on the Jews by the Germans. In this context, depend-
ing upon the individual culpability of the defendant, it is possi-
ble, albeit difficult, to speak of forgiveness. Nonetheless, the
logic of forgiveness dictates that only the victim may forgive
the offender.296 Taking a restrictive view of who is considered
the victim, only those persons who individually suffered at the
292. See 124 CoNG. REc. 26,844 (1978) (remarks of Congresswoman Holtz-
man) ("[Tihe presence of Nazi war criminals in America constitutes the unfin-
ished business of World War II.").
In addition, simply forgetting may render more credible the claims of
those who deny that the Holocaust ever occurred. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept.
26, 1985, at A23, col. 1 (relating testimony of 22-year-old witness at trial of neo-
Nazis that there was no systematic killing of Jews in World War II); The
Washington Post, April 6, 1985, at A9, col. 1 (reporting letter to Attorney Gen-
eral Meese suggesting that no mass gassing of Jews took place at the Buchen-
wald and Dachau camps).
293. Golding, Forgiveness and Regret, 16 THE PHIL. FORUM 121, 135 (1984-
85).
294. Id,
295. I&
296. See, e.g., Downie, Forgiveness, 15 PHIL. Q. 128, 128 (1965) ("If A for-
gives B, then A must have been injured by B: this seems to be a logically nec-
essary condition of forgiveness."); Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 158
(1939) ("No one has any right to forgive me except the person I have
injured.").
[Vol. 71:97
ASSISTANCE IN PERSECUTION
hands of the Nazis and their collaborators may forgive their
tormentors.2
97
An offer of forgiveness by the victim, however, does not al-
ter the appropriateness of punishment. Forgiveness and pardon
occupy two distinct moral realms. Individual victims and per-
haps groups forgive actors for the injuries or wrongs they have
inflicted. People acting in social roles pardon, not for any indi-
vidual injuries they have personally suffered, but for offenses
committed by the offender against the normative order which
the pardoner is authorized to protect. Further, an individual's
utterance of the words "I forgive you" is not sufficient to con-
stitute forgiveness.298 The person offering forgiveness must
also act to confirm that the previously existing moral relation-
ship is restored.299 Conversely, when the appropriate official
utters the words "I pardon you," he is in fact releasing the of-
fender from his obligations.300 Finally, and most importantly
for our purposes, a distinction exists with respect to the conse-
quences of the offender's acts. "To pardon a person.., is to let
him off the merited consequences of his actions .... ."301 On the
other hand, it is part of the logic of forgiveness that the victim
may both forgive and simultaneously believe that it is appropri-
ate for the offender to suffer the consequences of his acts.
3. Mercy
A call for mercy on behalf of the defendants is a third ar-
gument against the continuation of the OSI.3o2 Mercy is usually
297. The restrictive view is unnecessary. Those who may forgive could in-
clude a variety of persons who were indirectly injured by the Nazi persecution.
Cf. Card, On Mercy, 81 THE PHIL. REV. 182, 204 n.26 (April 1972) (the wronged
include law-abiding members of a community who are "taken advantage of"
by those who violate the law). This non-restrictive view creates the problem
of identifying witnesses. Who is in a position to forgive someone like Sprogis?
See supra text accompanying notes 199-224. According to the most restrictive
view, only the nine Jews, but they are all dead. Their families? Nothing indi-
cates that anyone knows who the nine Jews were, to say nothing of who their
families were or where they are now. All Jews who suffered at the hands of
the Nazis? All Jews, including those who were not alive at the time? All hu-
manity, by virtue of a common humanity shared with the nine Jews?
298. Downie, supra note 296, at 131-32.
299. AL at 133. Cf. Rashdall, The Ethics of Forgiveness, 10 INT'L J. OF ETH-
ics 193, 202 (Oct. 1899-July 1900) (later edition titled ETHics) (contending that
the person who must forgive may also naturally desire to penalize).
300. Downie, supra note 296, at 132.
301. Id at 131.
302. The term "defendants" is used to refer to those the OSI has already
formally charged and those against whom it might bring charges in the future.
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extended by a person charged with setting penalties for of-
fenses against a system of rules.30 3 When mercy is shown, the
offender receives a penalty less severe than that which the sys-
tem of rules authorizes, because imposition of the greater, au-
thorized penalty would cause the offender to suffer unusually
more than he deserves in view of his peculiar misfortunes, his
basic character, and the nature of his offense.3 0 4 Although an
offender has no right to mercy,30 5 a person in a position to dis-
pense mercy ought to do so when there is a disproportionality
between the authorized punishment and that which the of-
fender deserves.3 0 6
Mercy is typically shown on a case-by-case basis. Thus, for
the mercy argument to justify completely disbanding the OSI,
it is necessary to show that the defendants, as a class, have suf-
fered some peculiar misfortunes which would warrant an ex-
tension of mercy to all of them.30 7
One misfortune that the defendants share is the threat of
denaturalization or deportation, late in life, from a country
where they have lived for many years, to face an uncertain fu-
ture. Although this penalty is severe, in determining whether
it constitutes a peculiar misfortune it is wrong to focus only on
what is currently happening toward the end of their lives. Gen-
erally, the defendants entered the country illegally and enjoyed
the benefits of living in the United States for many years.30 8 In
303. See Card, supra note 297, at 189 (mercy "is a virtue of persons partici-
pating in and administering the rules of social institutions").
304. See id. at 184-87 (offering a more elaborate definition of mercy).
305. See id at 92 (arguing that there is no obligation to show mercy).
306. Id. at 190-92.
307. It is possible that all the defendants have experienced severe pangs of
conscience for the harm they did. Arguably, to impose the harsh penalties of
denaturalization and deportation now would cause them to suffer more than
they deserve. Allen Ryan states in response to this contention: "I see no evi-
dence whatever that any of these men have been even slightly discomforted,
let alone tormented, by their actions in the past." See A. RYAN, supra note 2,
at 336. Although Ryan has had the opportunity to observe most of the defend-
ants, he has seen them as the head of an office responsible for bringing
charges against them. In private, however, these men's consciences may have
burdened them. If this is the case, it is surprising that none of the defendants
to date has taken the opportunity to publicly unburden his conscience. The
Nazis did, however, take steps to ensure that those who perpetrated the Holo-
caust would not suffer severe psychological problems. R. Hilberg, supra note
102, at 1010-29. In the absence of solid evidence that the defendants have suf-
fered the pangs of conscience, we cannot take this as the source of their pecu-
liar misfortunes. Cf id- at 186 ("Showing mercy to an offender... is grounded
in a certain kind of appeal to his character and misfortunes.").
308. Card, supra note 297, at 205, notes that when an offender has avoided
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some cases, they avoided criminal prosecutions or other forms
of retribution that they would have suffered had they remained
in the countries where they committed their acts. Considering
the lives of the defendants as a whole, therefore, is proper.
Whether a defendant has suffered peculiar misfortunes that
render denaturalization or deportation undeserved depends on
his individual character and the nature of that defendant's par-
ticular acts. For those defendants whose contribution and the
resultant moral responsibility were extremely limited, perhaps
showing mercy is appropriate. Because this is not true of the
entire class of defendants, however, the argument for mercy
does not support the termination of the OSI.
B. RETAIN THE OSI
The arguments for discontinuing the OSI, including advo-
cating forgiveness, forgetfulness, and mercy, are outweighed by
several arguments for the OSI's retention. It is not enough,
however, to claim that "[w]e are putting [Nazi collaborators] on
trial because they broke the law."30 9 Many people break the
law; the question is why the Government should expend consid-
erable resources to pursue these old people. It is appropriate to
consider a proper response to the courtroom observer who
stated that "the money for bringing the [Theodorovic deporta-
tion] case would be better used to prosecute drug dealers."31 0
1. The United States Has a Special Responsibility
One set of arguments emphasizes the special responsibility
of the United States for its own past acts. A recent New York
Times editorial rationalized that the United States has a unique
duty to seek out the "old men" who, in their youth, operated
the "murder machine" established by Hitler "because it let a
number of war criminals slip to safety through its refugee pro-
grams after World War II."311 The force of this argument is
that the United States erred by permitting these individuals to
escape accountability for their acts and "slip to safety" by al-
lowing their entry to the United States. Thus, it presupposes a
prosecution for 20 years, for example, and is subsequently prosecuted, no unu-
sual misfortune is necessarily present: "[Tihe offender seems, if anything, to
have been rather lucky, since a prison term imposed twenty years earlier, for
example, might have robbed him of some of the best years of his life."
309. A. RYAN, supra note 2, at 335.
310. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
311. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at A34, col. 1.
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principle of rectification. If a country now has the power to
rectify some wrong it has done in the past, it has an obligation
to do so.
The obvious means of rectifying the wrong done by harbor-
ing Nazi collaborators in the United States is to return the de-
fendants to the countries where their acts were performed and
allow those countries to prosecute them, should they choose to
do so. United States immigration law, however, does not al-
ways permit extradition.312
Because the United States enabled Nazi collaborators to es-
cape formal judgment for their acts, and extradition is often
impermissible, a second solution is for the United States itself
to render judgment. That the United States bears responsibil-
ity for enabling the defendants to escape formal judgment,
however, does not necessarily mean that the United States has
the right to render that judgment itself. It has the authority to
judge those who have broken its immigration laws, but that
simply restates rather than answers the question why resources
are expended on these particular offenders.
Even putting this objection aside, a difficulty with this
"special responsibility" argument is that its premise-that by
permitting entry to the defendants, the United States enabled
them to escape formal judgment-is true of only some of the
defendants. In the case of someone like Mengele, the subject of
the New York Times editorial,313 it is likely that he would have
been put on trial had he remained in Germany. Yet, there is
still a question whether the collaborators the OSI pursues
would have ever faced trial had they not come to the United
States. In some cases, the answer is yes,31 4 but for low-level of-
ficials such as Sprogis,315 the answer is less certain. This uncer-
tainty prevails because Germany's record for pursuing persons
who persecuted civilians is far from exemplary.31 6 Conversely,
312. See 18 U.S.C. § 4100(b) (1982) ("An offender may be transferred from
the United States ... only to a country of which the offender is a citizen or
national.... An offender may be transferred to or from the United States
only with the offender's consent, and only if the offense for which the of-
fender was sentenced satisfies the requirement of double criminality .....
313. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
314. The case of Andrija Artukovic, for example, began many years ago
when Yugoslavia sought his extradition to try him for war crimes. Artukovic
v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd sub nom. Ivancevic v. Ar-
tukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954). Ar-
tukovic was recently extradited to Yugoslavia.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 199-206.
316. See R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 1000-1109.
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the Soviet Union, which now controls the countries where
many of the defendants committed their acts, might have pur-
sued them more aggressively than has the United States.
3 17
Perhaps it is enough that some of the defendants would cer-
tainly have faced trial had they not escaped to the United
States. Even if none of the countries in which these acts were
committed would have held the defendants accountable, how-
ever, an argument which supports the OSI and insists that the
defendants face judgment now is desirable.
Another argument emphasizing the United States' special
responsibility also presupposes the principle of rectification, but
asserts that the wrong was the United States' failure to have
done more to rescue Jews during World War II. Although
there is a sense that society cannot undo the wrong done, em-
phasis on the failure to rescue nevertheless suggests a form of
imperfect rectification. The Government could convene a for-
mal commission of inquiry to establish the extent of and rea-
sons for the United States' failure to rescue, to assign
responsibility where possible, and to determine how the Gov-
ernment should respond in an analogous future situation.318
This proposal has merit because it acknowledges the particular
wrong of failing to do more to rescue the Jews. It also renders
the Government less vulnerable to the charge that it is hypo-
critical for the United States to bring charges against the de-
fendants more than forty years after World War II when it has
failed to acknowledge its own moral culpability for failing to
317. A. RYAN, supra note 2, at 92-93, indicates that the Russians were eager
to try any defendants who were deported to the Soviet Union. He does not say
whether, immediately after World War II, the Soviet Union aggressively pur-
sued persons who had collaborated with the Nazis. In 1965, however, the So-
viet Union tried Maikovskis in absentia. He was convicted and sentenced to
death. In re Maikovskis, slip op. at 16 n.12 (BIA Aug. 14, 1984), aff'd sub
nom, Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct.
2915 (1986).
318. In 1979, President Carter established a Commission on the Holocaust.
Its principal function was to make "recommendations with respect to the es-
tablishment and maintenance of an appropriate memorial to those who per-
ished in the Holocaust." See Exec. Order No. 12,093, 3 C.F.R. 250 (1979). In its
Report to the President, the Commission's principal recommendations per-
tained to the establishment of a National Holocaust Memorial or Museum, in-
cluding an Educational Foundation, the creation of a "Committee on
Conscience," and the proclamation of annual Days of Remembrance of Victims
of the Holocaust. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE HOLOCAUST, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT, at 9-18 (1979). Congress established the Holocaust Memo-
rial Council to implement the recommendations of the President's Commis-
sion. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 1401-08 (1980).
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rescue Jews and for having permitted entry to the defendants
in the first place.
Considering the nature of the wrong this "special responsi-
bility" argument emphasizes, it provides only weak support for
the United States now rendering a formal judgment on the de-
fendants. Had there been no persecution of civilians, the
United States would not have had to rescue them. Because
there was persecution, however, and the United States should
have rescued more Jews, its failure to do so is only weakly rec-
tified by bringing to formal judgment those persons whose acts
initially created the obligation to rescue.
2. Retribution
Retributivist considerations support the OS's continuation.
Theories of punishment labeled retributivist accept one or
more of the following claims: (1) A person is punishable if and
only if she has committed an offense; (2) a person who has com-
mitted an offense deserves punishment; (3) the justification of
punishment consists in the justice of extending to those who
have committed offenses the treatment they deserve; and
(4) punishment is proper when "proportional to" the wicked-
ness of the offense.319
Retributivist theorists have encountered difficulties in ex-
plaining why persons who have committed offenses deserve
punishment and why justice requires treating them as they de-
serve. 320 Even if these claims can be explained and defended, a
retributivist must still rank offenses according to their "wick-
edness" and construct a scale of punishments "proportional to"
the wickedness of the offenses.321
319. J. FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING 118 (1970). See also H. HART, supra note 232, at 231 (treating pro-
positions similar to (1), (3), and (4) as providing a strict model of a retributive
theory). Bedau notes that Hart's model ignores desert, which Bedau regards
as central to retributivist theories. Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Pun-
ishmen; 75 J. PHIL. 601, 608-11 (1978).
320. Early retributivists, such as Hegel, spoke metaphorically of punish-
ment as a way of "cancelling" or "annulling" the moral wrong involved in an
offense, and as "deserved" for that reason. Hampton, The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 236 (1984) (discussing
Hegel's view). Modern retributivists rely on the different, but no more en-
lightening, metaphor of punishment as a way of "linking" or "connecting" the
criminal with "correct values." See R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS
374-97 (1981).
321. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 66, 69 (1976); R. NOZiCK,
supra note 320, at 363-97. Bedau is skeptical about whether the retributivist
requirement that the punishment fit the crime can be carried out in practice.
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Assuming that this retributivist framework makes some
sense, the question becomes whether the sanctions in the OSI's
denaturalization and deportation suits are "proportional to" or
"fit" the moral wrong of the defendants' offenses. Although
the sanctions of denaturalization and deportation are not tradi-
tional criminal sanctions, they nevertheless seem particularly
proportional to the moral wrong of the offenses.
Stripping Jews of their citizenship played a central role in
the Nazis' plan to annihilate the Jews. The Nazis began by de-
claring that Jews who lived outside the Reich were not consid-
ered German nationals. At the same time, the Nazis were
actively deporting Jews from the Reich.322 As they proceeded
to annihilate Jews in other countries, the Nazis typically moved
first against stateless Jews, while pressing local authorities to
revoke the citizenship of classes of Jews within their terri-
tory.323 Stateless Jews were thus more vulnerable to Nazi ag-
gression than those who retained their citizenship.
Given the way the Nazis deprived people of their citizen-
ship, denaturalizing those who assisted the Nazis is a particu-
larly fitting response to the harm they wrought. The
defendants themselves need not have contributed to the Nazis'
denaturalization of Jews, nor need the Jews, whom the defend-
ants assisted in persecuting, have themselves become stateless.
It is sufficient that, given the role of denaturalization in the Na-
zis' objectives and the defendants' contributions to its imple-
mentation, denaturalizing the defendants is as "proportional" a
response as we are likely to find.
Like the Flying Dutchman, an individual deported from
the United States must find some country willing to take him
in. This image of the homeless/stateless person seeking refuge
is particularly apt in the context of the Nazis' persecution of
the Jews. The Nazis uprooted Jewish families from their
homes and concentrated them in alien ghettoes. They forcibly
removed them from those ghettoes onto packed trains for
transport to "the East," and death. Many of the defendants
played important roles in these processes of "rounding up,"
concentrating, and deporting Jews. Again, assuming that the
retributivist framework makes sense, the fact that the defend-
Bedau, supra note 319, at 608-11. In reply, von Hirsch maintains that such pes-
simism is premature. von Hirsch, Proportionality and Deser4 a Reply to
Bedau, 75 J. PHiL. 622, 623-24 (1978).
322. See H. ARENDT, supra note 145, at 157.
323. Id. at 163, 165, 167, 170, 182.
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ants are now forced to find a place of refuge is a particularly
fitting response to the roles they played in assisting the Nazis
in depriving Jews of their homes, security, and, ultimately,
their lives.
3. Deterrence
Moving from past acts to the future, the OSI's continued
prosecution of defendants arguably is justifiable on the ground
that doing so will deter others from acting in similar ways.
This deterrence argument is weak. First, the efficacy of
the deterrent effect is a function of the severity of the penalty
discounted by the likelihood of its imposition. Although the
OSI is now vigilant in pursuing Nazi collaborators, the record
of the United States Government prior to the OSI's foundation
is very sorry indeed.3 24 Even Germany, not to mention some
countries that seemed eager to have and protect high-level Nazi
officials, has done little to ensure that Nazis who persecuted ci-
vilians were caught and severely punished.325 Some South
American countries have afforded haven to Nazi criminals. 26
Taking into account the record of the United States and the
rest of the world since World War II, the OSI's efforts are
likely to make only an incremental contribution to what is al-
ready of minimal deterrence effect.
Second, and more important, the deterrence argument fails
to capture the special moral significance of holding the defend-
ants accountable. On a deterrence view, the state uses "pain co-
ercively so as to progressively eliminate certain types of
behavior .... -"327 The only reason punishment provides a rea-
son for not doing an act, on the deterrence view, is that it in-
creases the negative effects if the person is caught. It does not
seek to provide a reason based on the person's realization that
324. A. RYAN, supra note 2, at 29-64.
325. On Germany, see R. HILBERG, supra note 54, at 1000-1109.
326. Several South American countries were particularly hospitable to for-
mer Nazis. See A. Riding, Where Nazi Refugees Found the Climate to Their
Liking, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 22, 1979,
§ 1, at A7, col. 3.
327. Hampton, supra note 320, at 214. When used in its narrow sense, "de-
terrence" occurs only when the person wants to do the proscribed act but does
not because of her awareness of the bad effects that will ensue if she does. In
a wider sense, punishment has achieved its deterrent effect when people are
led to obey the law, whether the mechanism involved is fear of punishment,
appreciation of the law's morality, or simple habit. See Hawkins, Punishment
and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing and Habituative Effects, 1969 WIs.
L. REV. 550, 550.
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the action is morally wrong. OSI's efforts have moral signifi-
cance, however, not simply because they increase the downside
for those who might, in the future, contemplate similar acts.
Rather, it is important to make a statement now, for the de-
fendants' sake as well as our own, that the acts they performed
were wrong and that they are morally responsible for them.
4. Promulgating Moral Standards
Recent discussions of the justification of punishment em-
phasize its communicative aspect.328 Punishment communi-
cates, forcefully and emphatically, to the criminal and society at
large, the moral wrongness of the criminal's offense.3 29 By
means of communicating moral right and wrong, punishment
also plays a role in the moral education of the criminal and the
larger society.330 Theories emphasizing this symbolic or expres-
sive function of punishment are not easy to categorize as either
retributivist or utilitarian.33 ' Insofar as these theories attempt
to match the condemnatory aspect of the punishment to the se-
riousness of the crime, or to communicate to the criminal what
the world would be like if his acts were generally done, they
share retributivist features.33 2 The theories also "tremble[ ] on
the margin of a Utilitarian theory, '3 33 inasmuch as they antici-
pate beneficial results from punishing offenders.
328. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, supra note 319, at 95 (discussing "expressive
function" of punishment); H. HART, supra note 232, at 235 (noting recent ver-
sion of retributivism, emphasizing "the value of the authoritative expression,
in the form of punishment, of moral condemnation for the moral wickedness
involved in the offense."); R. NOZICK, supra note 320, at 370-74 (explaining the
theory of retribution); Hampton, supra note 320, at 231 (emphasizing that
"punishment is a way of teaching ethical knowledge.. ."); cf. Doe v. Roe, 400
N.Y.S. 2d 668, 679, 93 Misc. 2d 201 (1977) (punitive damages are sometimes
available to "'express indignation at the defendants' wrong rather than a
value set on plaintiff's loss' ") (quoting Gostowski v. Roman Catholic Church,
262 N.Y. 320, 324, 186 N.E. 798, 800 (1933)).
329. See supra note 328.
330. Hampton, supra note 320, at 212-13, particularly emphasizes punish-
ment as a means of moral education.
331. H. HART, supra note 232, at 235, notes that such "reprobation" theo-
ries have both retributive and utilitarian versions. R. NOZICK, supra note 320,
at 371, calls his theory "teleological retributivism." Hampton, supra note 320,
at 213, apparently regards her moral education theory of punishment as dis-
tinct from traditional retributive or utilitarian/deterrence theories because it
presupposes "particular positions on the nature of morality and human free-
dom ......
332. C. CARD, RETRIBUTIVE PENAL LIABILITY (Am. Phil. Q. Monographs,
No. 7, 1973).
333. H. HART, supra note 232, at 235.
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The problem that proponents of the symbolic or expressive
function of punishment confront is explaining why it is justifi-
able to punish offenders to communicate moral views or to edu-
cate the criminal and society.3 34 Their views prompt questions
as to why simply taking out advertisements or devoting more
resources to education would not accomplish the same result.
Part of the answer is that punishment is the conventional way
society communicates the moral views about which it feels most
strongly. Perhaps painful experiences of a certain sort are nec-
essary for the communication of certain types of moral
messages.335 Moreover, whether punishment is justified may
depend on the context, for example, the importance of the
moral values being communicated and the likelihood that their
importance is conveyable by means other than punishing those
persons who disregard those values.
The important message communicated by the OSI's denat-
uralization and deportation suits-that the defendants breached
a profound moral boundary by assisting the Nazis in perse-
cuting civilians-is probably not effectively conveyable by any
means other than continuing the suits. During World War II,
the United States did little to aid threatened Jews.336 After the
war, it knowingly admitted persons who had assisted the Nazis
in persecuting civilians and for more than thirty years did little
to disturb their enjoyment of the benefits of life in the United
States.337 Given this history of action and inaction, mere words
are unlikely to communicate the message that the people perse-
cuted by the Nazis mattered and that those who assisted the
Nazis acted very wrongly. Not only United States citizens but
also citizens in other countries must receive this message. This
is particularly true for those in Western Europe who are in-
dined to minimize the wrongness of acts or omissions that fa-
cilitated Nazi persecution.338 Because it is important to convey
334. H. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 2 n.3 (1968). Hart noted early on that "denuncia-
tion does not imply the deliberate imposition of suffering which is the feature
needing justification.... ." Both Hampton and Nozick indicate that the prob-
lem is the justification of punishing to convey a message or teach a certain
moral lesson. See Hampton, supra note 320, at 223; R. NOZICK, supra note 320,
at 371.
335. See Hampton, supra note 320, at 224 (noting "that only the infliction
of pain of a certain sort following a wrongdoing is necessarily connected with
the goal of moral education.") (emphasis in original).
336. See supra note 1.
337. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
338. The controversy over whether Kurt Waldheim assisted the Nazis,
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these messages, denaturalization and deportation of those who
assisted the Nazis are a justified and necessary means of
conveyance.
Abolition of the OSI would certainly eliminate an impor-
tant opportunity to promulgate the view that the defendants'
acts were serious wrongs against undeserving victims. Even
worse consequences are possible, however, depending on how
people interpret, whether rationally or not, the cessation of the
OSI's activity. For example, people may draw the inference,
merely because so many years have elapsed since the acts were
committed, that the defendants have atoned for their wrongs.
Or, if the government stops pursuing defendants, it risks the
appearance of condoning their acts, or of supporting those
groups, including neo-Nazis, who deny that the Holocaust ever
occurred.339
C. IMPOSITION OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Even if disbanding the OSI is unwarranted, perhaps a stat-
ute of limitations on the charges it brings is appropriate.3 40
One consideration supporting such statutes is that, after a cer-
tain period of time, evidence becomes stale and loses its proba-
tive value.341  This consideration, by itself, however, is
insufficient to justify imposing a statute of limitations.342
which arose during his recent successful campaign for the presidency of Aus-
tria, raises this issue with particular force.
339. See supra note 292.
340. A number of groups that have wanted to eliminate the OSI have also
sought to impose a statute of limitations on the charges the OSI brings. See
Washington Post, April 6, 1985, at A9, col. 1. But see N.Y. Times, June 13,
1985, at A34, col. 1 (editorial against statute of limitations). As a practical mat-
ter, it is difficult to see how any plausible statute of limitations would not, in
effect, result in the termination of the OSI.
341. See, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984) (statutes of
limitations protect against prosecutors bringing stale criminal charges); United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (statutes of limitations are the "pri-
mary guarantee" against overly stale charges).
342. The federal district court and court of appeals judges hearing these
cases encounter evidentiary questions as part of their daily work and they are
skilled at making decisions on admissibility and weight. In view of this exper-
tise, the mere fact that much of the crucial evidence in the cases is forty to
forty-five years old does not warrant imposing an arbitrary deadline for bring-
ing charges. The existence of the ancient documents exception to hearsay,
Fed. R. Evid. 803(16), indicates that the age of documents itself provides virtu-
ally no basis for imposing a statute of limitations.
The structure of statutes of limitations also indicates that evidentiary con-
siderations by themselves are insufficient to warrant imposing a statute. New
York's statute, for example, is typical. It provides no limitations period for
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A similar argument is that just as prosecutorial delay in
bringing an indictment raises due process concerns,3 43 perhaps
it is unfair to bring charges against the defendants after so
much time has elapsed, because they have not evaded detection
and the government has unreasonably delayed in bringing
charges. Were its premise true, this argument would tend to
support applying a statute of limitations to these cases.
With respect to the first contention, although most of the
defendants misrepresented their wartime activities in order to
gain admission to the United States,344 they have done little to
avoid detection since arriving. As for the second contention,
the Government had evidence that Nazi collaborators were
gaining admission to the United States after the war, but in the
years prior to the founding of the OSI in 1979,3 5 the offices
charged with investigating such persons did virtually nothing to
bring them to justice.346 Many of the cases were not triable,
however, without access to supporting documents possessed
only by the Soviet Union. An agreement securing access to this
evidence was not reached until 1980.347 Moreover, whether it is
fair to bring a person to account for a crime after a long period
has lapsed depends on the seriousness of the crime.348 Given
the seriousness of the allegations against the defendants, the
Government did not unreasonably delay and was not negligent
in bringing charges to such an extent as to warrant a statute of
limitations.
A third argument for a statute of limitations relies on
claims about personal identity and desert. When features of a
person, such as character, have changed over the course of a
Class A felonies (murder and kidnapping), a five-year period for other felo-
nies, two years for misdemeanors, and one year for petty offenses. N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 30.10 (McKinney 1981). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1982) (no limita-
tion on prosecution for offense punishable by death); 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982)
(5-year limitation on non-capital offenses). This differentiation of periods ac-
cording to the seriousness of the crime, in combination with the concern about
stale evidence, supports the Supreme Court's view that statutes of limitations
"represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the de-
fendant in administering and receiving justice; they 'are made for the repose of
society and the protection of those who may [during the limitation] ... have
lost their means of defence."' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971)
(citing Public Schools v. Walker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 282, 288 (1869)).
343. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
345. A. RYAN, supra note 2, at 61.
346. Id. at 31, 41-42, 44, 329-31.
347. Id at 65-93.
348. See supra note 342.
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lifetime, perhaps punishment is undeserved late in life.349 Be-
cause Parfit has presented the most recent and elaborate de-
fense of this position, this Article discusses this third argument
in relation to his work.
Parfit distinguishes between Reductionist and non-Reduc-
tionist views of personal identity.350 According to the Reduc-
tionist view, personal identity is solely a matter of physical and
psychological continuities. Although it is always the case, in
logic, that a person either is or is not the same as some other
person, personal identity, by nature, is a matter of degree and
depends on the degree to which the physical and psychological
continuities hold.3 51 In contrast, the non-Reductionist view de-
nies that personal identity is exclusively a matter of physical
and psychological continuities; instead, it consists of a further
fact beyond these continuities. The non-Reductionist insists
that personal identity is, both in its logic and in its nature, "all-
or-nothing."352
Although only the non-Reductionist view may seem to jus-
tify the claim that people deserve punishment, Parfit insists
that in the Reductionist view people can properly deserve pun-
ishment for their past crimes. Nevertheless, there is still an
important difference between the two views:
I shall make one general claim. When some convict is now less
closely connected to himself at the time of his crime, he deserves less
punishment. If the connections are very weak, he may deserve none.
Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few rightful holders of the
Nobel Peace Prize, confesses that it was he who, at the age of twenty,
injured a policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious
crime, this man may not now deserve to be punished.... I believe
that my claim is plausible. It is one of the reasons why many coun-
349. Such changes are directly relevant to theories which justify punish-
ment on the basis of the defendant's present state-for example, reformation
and specific deterrence-rather than on the defendant's relation to the crimi-
nal act. See D. PARFIT, supra note 252, at 325.
350. Parfit's most recent statement of his views is in REASONS AND PER-
SONS, supra note 252. In an earlier article, he referred to the views as Com-
plex (Reductionist) and Simple (Non-Reductionist). See Parfit, Later Selves
and Moral Principles, in PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL RELATIONS 137 (A. Mon-
tefiore ed. 1973).
351. See Parfit, Later Selves and Moral Principles, supra note 350, at 139-
40. Under the Reductionist view, the identity of a person over time is like that
of a nation. Just as certain significant breaks within the history of a nation
like Great Britain justify speaking of a series of successive nations, such as An-
glo-Saxon, Medieval, or Post-Imperial England, so also do significant breaks in
physical and psychological continuties justify speaking of successive selves of
the same person. Id at 142.
352. Id-
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tries have Statutes of Limitations: periods of time after which a crim-
inal cannot be punished for a past crime. These statutes may not
cover very serious crimes. This is what my claim implies.
3 5 3
The issue is whether Parfit's view supports imposing a statute
of limitations on the cases the OSI brings.
A threshold question is whether the physical and psycho-
logical continuities of the defendants have become very weak.
It is not suprising that Parfit uses a very specific example when
discussing the relation between the weakening of the continu-
ities and whether a person deserves punishment. This type of
inquiry is most properly made on a case-by-case basis by the
sentencing authority who considers relevant information on the
defendant after his conviction. Statutes of limitations, on the
other hand, are linked with categories of crimes or acts, each
carrying a distinctive time period. To institute a statute of limi-
tations on the basis of Parfit's theory, it is necessary to estab-
lish that, for people who commit that kind of crime, the
continuities are generally very weak after a specific number of
years. Even if this question were set aside and the assumption
made that the physical and psychological continuities are very
weak for all the defendants, as Parfit states his views, this
would not justify imposing a statute of limitations for two
reasons.
First, Parfit claims that when the continuities between a
person as he now is and as he was when he committed the
crime are weak "he deserves less punishment. 3 54 The contin-
uum Parfit identifies is one of degrees of punishment. As we
approach one end, however, we do not eventually reach a point
at which filing charges against an individual is no longer
proper, rather, we reach points where punishment should be
less severe. Thus, we do not obtain an argument for a statute
of limitations, but rather for the claim that, when the continu-
ities are very weak, less severe punishment is warranted.355
Parfit is misled in the way he describes the relation be-
tween the self who committed the act and the later self who
353. D. PARFIT, supra note 252, at 326.
354. I&
355. Jim Weygandt has suggested that when a defendant's level of culpabil-
ity is low he should receive a less severe punishment, perhaps involving some-
thing like community service. Although this suggestion deserves considera-
tion, given the statutory law and the Supreme Court's refusal to allow district
courts to take equitable considerations into account, see Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at
516-18, implementation is impossible short of changing the law. In any case, it
is a different suggestion from the claim that a statute of limitations is
required.
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faces punishment. He treats the later self as a "sane accom-
plice" of the earlier.3 56 Treating the relation between the two
selves as that of principal and accomplice, however, is wrong.
In criminal law the accomplice deserves less punishment be-
cause although he contributed to making the crime possible, his
contribution was less than that of the principal. Since, in
Parfit's example, the criminal's later self makes no contribu-
tion to the act performed by his earlier self, the later self is not
an accomplice, sane or insane, of the former.357
Second, Parfit claims that statutes of limitations may not
cover very serious crimes. Because the acts for which the de-
fendants are accused are very serious, Parfit would therefore
presumably maintain that a statute of limitations should not
apply.
Parfit's views, as he states them, do not support imposing a
statute of limitations. When the implications of his Reduction-
ist view of personal identity are properly drawn, however, the
two objections just discussed are removed. Whereas Parfit, mis-
led by his sane accomplice idea, mistakenly says that the later
self deserves less punishment, it is proper to say that the later
self "deserves punishment less."358 The proper continuum is
thus not of degrees of punishment but of deserving punish-
ment. Only on the latter continuum is there eventually a point
at which the level of desert is so low that it becomes inappro-
priate to file charges. Assuming a case-by-case analysis, it is at
this point that the statute of limitations becomes appropriate.
Furthermore, nothing about the Reductionist view of personal
356. D. PARFIT, supnra note 252, at 326. "Just as someone's deserts corre-
spond to the degree of his complicity with some criminal, so his deserts now,
for some past crime, correspond to the degree of psychological connectedness
between himself now and himself when committing that crime." I&
357. In a letter commenting on my discussion, Sydney Shoemaker has sug-
gested that my criticism of Parfit's sane accomplice comparison depends on a
too literal reading of it. Shoemaker interprets Parfit as making the primarily
negative point that just as the diminished responsibility of the accomplice is
not due to mental illness, neither is that of the later self. Shoemaker believes
that, for Parfit, only in the limiting case does the later self have no responsi-
bility. In other cases, he has reduced responsibility and it is here that the sane
accomplice analogy is supposed to apply. Even with this reconstruction, the
analogy remains lame.
358. Bernard Williams discusses various ways in which our moral views
might require alteration in order to accommodate Parfit's "scalar" view of per-
sonal identity. B. WILLUAMS, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL
LuCK, 1, 6 (1981). Williams believes that an attempt to apply this view to the
moral notion of promising, which is analogous to the analysis of desert offered
in the text, is either a "lunatic" idea, or "dotty" or presupposes the very non-
Reductionist view Parfit wants to replace. Id at 7-8.
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identity requires the exclusion of serious crimes. Only with re-
spect to serious crimes does it seem unfair to hold responsible a
later self who has virtually no continuities with the earlier self
who committed the crime.
Although the two objections to the way Parfit states the
implications of his views are removable, two central questions
remain. The first is whether, for virtually all the defendants,
the psychological continuities between their present selves and
their selves forty to forty-five years ago are sufficiently weak,
and their characters sufficiently changed, that they no longer
deserve punishment. It is a mistake to simply rely on the fact
that although these people allegedly committed heinous acts in
some cases, many years ago, they have since lived peaceful, law-
abiding lives in the United States. Rather than constituting evi-
dence of changed characters, it is possible that these varied be-
havioral patterns are simply different manifestations of the
same character.3 59 Quite plausibly, the defendants' memories
seem dim360 and their psychological continuities less strong be-
cause they chose to leave the places and the people of the past
to come to a country where they could live in anonymity.36 1 In
the absence of further evidence that the psychological continu-
ities are sufficiently weak for reasons unrelated to the defend-
ants' own acts, it is correct to say that they now deserve
punishment and that imposition of a statute of limitations is
inappropriate.
The second question is whether Parfit's view of personal
identity, thus far assumed, is true. This is a broad and difficult
question. As a practical matter, however, Parfit's view of per-
sonal identity, which to some extent conflicts with our ordinary
view of the matter, is unlikely to persuade Congress to impose
a statute of limitations on the charges OSI brings.
Even if Parfit's views are true, they provide only weak sup-
port for a statute of limitations. His emphasis on the weaken-
ing of psychological and physical continuities over time and on
changes of character provide some support for taking such fac-
359. Cf Lifton, Mengele, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985, (Magazine), at 16 (pro-
posing psychological theory of "doubling" to explain personality of people like
Mengele).
360. But see United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d at 124 (Mansfield, J., concur-
ring) (if the incident with the nine Jews were the only one in Sprogis's life,
"one would reasonably expect it to have made a life-long impression on him").
361. "[The defendants'] one abiding trait seems to have been a determina-
tion to stay anonymous and to cultivate the good will of their neighbors." A.
RYAN, supra note 2, at 269.
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tors into account on a case-by-case basis when determining the
punishment someone convicted of a crime should receive. His
argument is therefore better applied as a reason why a sentenc-
ing authority ought to show mercy to a defendant whose char-
acter now is very different from what it was at the time of the
crime. In addition, both retributivist and utilitarian theories of
punishment, including general and specific deterrence, offer
plausible explanations of the typical structure of statutes of
limitations, in which the period lengthens as the seriousness of
the crime increases. 362 This structure suggests that beliefs
about physical and psychological continuities play a role, albeit
a limited one, in justifying such statutes. Were these beliefs
more important, however, statutes of limitations would less
characteristically discriminate between crimes of different de-
grees of severity. Therefore, even where the physical and psy-
chological continuities of the defendants are now very weak,
this fact is not a strong consideration in support of a statute of
limitations.3 63 The considerations supporting statutes of limita-
tion thus do not warrant imposing a limitation on the charges
the OSI brings.
CONCLUSION
This Article addresses moral responsibility for collective
actions and the cases that the Office of Special Investigations
has brought. It has argued that the defendants assisted in per-
secution if they personally participated in persecution or know-
ingly and more than minimally contributed to a group that
persecuted civilians. This conclusion requires the belief that
there are standards of conduct to which we can rightly hold the
defendants. If it is appropriate to apply these standards and to
hold the defendants morally and legally responsible for their
failure to meet them, we also have a responsibility to ensure
362. See supra note 342. See also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421,
1430 (D.C. Cal. 1985) ("Because [statutes of limitations] are equivalent to acts
of amnesty, the length of the ... limitation [period] bears a necessary relation
to the heinousness of the crime."); United States v. Provenzano, 423 F. Supp.
662, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1977).
363. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that very serious crimes,
such as those of which the defendants are accused, are typically not covered by
a statute of limitations. The United States seems to have supported the princi-
ple of no statute of limitations on war crimes, as embodied in the Convention
on the Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968) (effective Nov. 11, 1970). See discussion in Handel v. Ar-
tukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
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that people are educated to those standards and that they are
affirmed in our public acts through these cases. The Office of
Special Investigations plays a role in educating the public to
such standards and affirming their importance. If we permit
the OSI to disband, we ourselves will bear some measure of
moral responsibility.
